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NOTE
Tax and Other Legal Aspects of Business
Involvement in Ghetto Development Programs
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE WAR ON PoVERY has failed to provide a solution to the
Nation's urban crisis. The discontent -and turmoil which con-
tinue to emanate from the core areas of our cities bear witness to
this failure. Conventional welfare programs based on the handout
are a mere palliative for the underlying economic and social causes
of chronic poverty. The dole is demeaning; it tends to promote
economic dependence rather than afford the disadvantaged an op-
portunity for becoming productive citizens. Big government, oper-
ating through traditional channels, has been unable to offer par-
ticularized programs to accommodate what are essentially local
needs. With characteristic inefficiency, the faceless bureaucracy has
hindered effective implementation of existing programs, while legis-
lative laggardness has inhibited the development of new and inno-
vative approaches to the urban poverty problem. It is in this per-
spective of general governmental failure that critics have called for
increased involvement of private industry in the effort to eradicate
poverty and blight from the cities.1
To date, the greatest response from the private sector .has been
in -the form of increased employment opportunities for the "hard
core" unemployed. Under the Manpower Taining Act of 1962,2
the federal government has been providing direct subsidies to pri-
vate companies in order to absorb the increased rehabilitation and
training costs associated with hiring from disadvantaged minority
'The findings of the Community Self-Determination Act of 1968, S.3876, 90th
Con&, 2d Sess. (introduced July 24, 1968), embody a general indictment of existing
government programs:
Programs and policies which tax some to support others offer no hope and no
opportunity to those who have the capacity to become productive, contribut-
ing citizens. Handouts are demeaning; they do violence to a man, strip him
of dignity, and breed in him a resentment toward the total system. The Na-
tion must find ways, instead, to help presently nonproductive citizens achieve
the independence, self-respect, and well-being enjoyed by their more fortunate
fellows .... Id. § 2 (b).
The bipartisan bill calls for a broad partnership between private industry and govern-
ment to place a solid economic floor under the ghettoes of the Nation's cities. For a
comprehensive discussion of the bill, see notes 107-29 infra & accompanying text.
242 U.S.C. §§ 2571-2620 (Supp. 1969). The specific programs implemented un-
der this legislation are discussed in note 11 infra.
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groups. Many corporations have participated in the effort.3  Be-
yond question, the creation of productive jobs for inner city resi-
dents is an essential first step toward ending the cycle of poverty
which has precipitated today's urban crisis. Jobs alone, however,
will not be sufficient to effect complete economic integration of
ghetto areas which must be the ultimate goal of any meaningful
urban development program. To break the cycle of economic de-
pendence, efforts must be made to evolve programs which augment
the ghetto's social capital (housing and social service facilities), in-
crease the concentration of productive resources in or near disad-
vantaged areas, and, most importantly, provide the means whereby
inner city residents can ultimately acquire ownership and control of
these new institutions. Only through such a total development ef-
fort, which will provide the disadvantaged with a vested proprietary
interest in local institutions, can -the dissidence and destruction now
plaguing the cities be ended.
Some have suggested that the profit motive is inconsistent with
involvement in broad-based development programs, that private cor-
porations should limit their activities to hiring and training the
hard core for employment in existing institutions, and that the
creation of new social capital must be left exclusively to govern-
ment.4 It is submitted that this view is ill-conceived, for it overesti-
mates the ability of government to get the job done, and fails to rec-
ognize that private industry has a substantial dollars and cents inter-
est in preserving the vitality of the cities. The exigencies of the
times, combined with the government's failure to provide a solution,
call for a reassessment of the traditional roles of 'the public and pri-
vate sectors in the area of social welfare. More than any other in-
terest group, the corporate establishment has a vested interest in the
prosperity and civil tranquility of the urban environment.5 Most of
the Nation's wealth has become concentrated in large corporations,
which also control most of the highly skilled managerial talent.
These considerations combine to place a social responsibility on pri-
vate industry. Moreover, aside from an abundance of capital and
problem-solving expertise, industry has other unique assets which
make it particularly well suited to undertake urban development
3 The various companies participating in job training programs under the Man-
power Act are listed in Kalb, How Businessmen and the Ghetto Can Get Together,
IRON AGE, May 30, 1968, at 47.
4 Henry Ford II has remarked that investments in education, housing, and other so-
cial capital must be "done by people other than business." Id.
5 The extent of private industry's vested interest is analyzed in notes 69, 148-49
infra & accompanying text.
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projects. Private industry has the necessary experience in working
with major capital investment enterprises and a tradition of solving
problems through innovation of new techniques. Local corpora-
tions would be highly sensitive to the particular needs of the com-
munity and thus better able to tailor a development effort. Once
committed, industry could assume primary responsibility for such de-
velopment programs as constructing low-income housing and crea-
ting new businesses in ghetto areas, while the federal government
would support these private efforts through direct subsidies and tax
incentives.
In an effort to assess the attitude of industry with respect to its
role in ghetto development programs, over 30 major corporations in
the greater Cleveland, Ohio, area were surveyed during the summer
of 1968. Each corporation was sent a comprehensive questionnaire
asking it to respond to specific questions relating to community de-
velopment programs which it had already initiated or contemplated
initiating, and what, if any, legal problems it anticipated might arise
out of such activity. ( In addition to serving as a means of compiling
6 The survey was conducted by members of the Law Review Staff, and made possible
by a grant from the School of Law. The following is a sample questionnaire:
L Does your corporation have any "set" policy regarding corporate aid
to partially alleviate Cleveland's community problems?
a. Has your corporation completed any community projects in the past?
b. Is your corporation presently engaged in administering any community
programs?
c. Does your corporation have any plans for future projects?
d. What reasons would your corporation list for not acting at all?
II. If your corporation were to begin a project to partially alleviate some
existing social problem - would you fear any legal reprecussions in any
of the following areas?
a. General corporate law constraints?
1. Charge of ultra vires acts?
2. Of wasting of assets?
3. Of bad business judgment?
4. Others?
b. Anti-trust problems?
c. Tax or securities problems?
d. Problems with union contracts?
e. Others?
III. What economic drawbacks or pressures are present or would be likely
to present themselves if your corporation decided to enter the field of com-
munity improvement?
a. Loss of profits?
b. Loss of shareholders?
c. Union strikes?
d. Others?
IV. Has your corporation engaged in discovering sources of aid available
to a profit-making institution interested in administering a program to fulfill
some community needs?
V. What programs do you believe a corporation of your size and financial
1969]
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basic information, the questionnaire was used as an introduction for
interviewers who pursued the issues further in personal discussions
with executives from each of the corporations surveyed. Although
each company specifically requested that its answers to the various
questions remain confidential, some generalizations are possible:
(1) A few companies had no interest in anything but -their own
profit-making. (2) Most felt that they had a definite social respon-
sibility, and many were exploring ways of becoming more deeply
involved in community development. Although only one company
had become unilaterally involved with rehabilitating ghetto hous-
ing and financing an independent inner city business, several
companies had contributed to a revolving fund for housing rehabilita-
tion and most had made donations to Cleveland: Now!, a compre-
hensive inner city development program initiated by Cleveland's
standing could most beneficially provide to help solve the urban problem and
what legal difficulties would you foresee in each?
a. Training hard core unemployed?
b. Rehabilitating slum and fringe area housing?
c. Aid to education?
d. Transfer or lease of assets used in a part of your production process to
a community corporation in return for senior securities in that cor-
oration. The members of the community would have equity owner-
ship and control, and your corporation would in turn become a custo-
mer?
e. Health programs?
f. Youth programs in fringe and slum areas?
1. Dances or canteens?
2. Summer vacations at employees' homes?
3. Baseball leagues or recreation areas?
g. Self help programs for homeowners in ghettoes and fringe areas? (For
example, joining a revolving loan guarantee fund for homeowners, or
providing supplies for rehabilitation at cost)
VI. What incentives do you believe should be offered by federal and/or
state government to a corporation about to enter the field of community im-
provement?
a. Tax credits?
b. Relaxing anti-trust laws?
c. Enabling legislation to protect directors from shareholders and com-
plaining unions?
d. Others?
VII. Do you feel that you would breach the fiduciary obligation you owe to
your shareholders by investing their money in projects of this nature?
a. Have you ever considered the possibility of a shareholder suit against
the corporation for its inaction in community affairs?
b. Do you feel that the actions taken by some corporations in alleviating
urban problems have placed an additional burden upon directors to
become involved with community problems?
VIII. What problems concern you relative to corporate entry into commu-
nity affairs which have not been mentioned in the foregoing?
IX. Please list in order of importance the five major roadblocks which would
confront your corporation if it were about to embark upon a commu-
nity project.
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Mayor, Carl B. Stokes.7  (3) Most directors and executives did not
perceive any significant legal constraints on corporate social involve-
ment. Shareholder actions to restrain the corporation from acting
were scoffed at, while tax and securities problems were considered
surmountable. Although several corporations were apprehensive
about labor opposition to social programs directed at minority
groups, the vast majority of corporations viewed limited capital re-
sources as the only major constraint. (4) Since most of the compa-
nies viewed themselves as being in intensely competitive industries,
they felt that private corporations could not underwrite major de-
velopment efforts alone without some government assistance either
in the form of grants or tax incentives. The staff of interviewers
was left with a general feeling that without some form of govern-
ment subsidy, any social development program would be completely
contingent upon continued economic prosperity, and that even a
mild business recession would cause a severe cut-back in socially-
oriented activities. However, despite the fact that most of the
corporations responding welcomed tax incentives in the form of de-
ductions for expenditures on community projects or even tax cred-
its, there was unanimous opposition to involvement in any govern-
ment backed programs which would restrict private development
efforts to tight regulations and entangle them in a welter of bureau-
cratic red tape.
Using the results of the survey as a frame of reference, this Note
will endeavor to expose the myriad of legal and economic factors
that a private corporation should consider before initiating an urban
development project. Examining the alternatives from the view-
point of a hypothetical corporation, called X Corporation, the dis-
cussion explores the ways in which a private corporation could best
employ its capital and managerial talent toward the end of pro-
viding inner city residents with ownership and control of productive
facilities located in -the community. Specifically, Part II investigates
the organizational vehicles which X Corporation could use to (1)
establish a subsidiary in the ghetto, nurture -its independence, and ul-
timately divest itself of ownership and control; and (2) mobilize
the resources of the business community to encourage minority en-
trepreneurship by providing seed capital and essential counseling
services to independently owned ghetto businesses employing local
residents. In evaluating the various organizational vehicles which
7 Cleveland: Now! is discussed in notes 92-94 infra & accompanying text.
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might be employed to achieve these objectives, special attention is
given to: (a) the availability of funds under existing federal pro-
grams; (b) possible income tax advantages in the form of deduc-
tions for expenditures; and (c) the overall effectiveness of various
programs in eliciting broad community support and participation.
Attention then focuses on the comprehensive Community Self-De-
termination Act of 1968,8 which if adopted would afford private in-
dustry broad tax incentives for establishing productive facilities in
ghetto areas, and provide a mechanism whereby ownership and con-
trol of these facilities would ultimately pass to local residents.
Lastly, Part III explores the possibility of shareholder suits to re-
strain corporate social involvement, and the more novel question of
whether shareholders can take any meaningful steps to require man-
agement to participate in inner city development programs.
II. CREATING AND ASSISTING INNER
CITY BUSINESSES
A, Formation of a Ghetto Subsidiary
Assuming that X Corporation is a relatively large industrial con-
cern, the most direct action which it could take to create new em-
ployment opportunities and establish the groundwork for eventual
community proprietorship would be through formation of a wholly-
owned subsidiary in the ghetto area pursuant to a plan whereby
ownership and control would ultimately be vested in area residents.'
8 S. 3876, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
9 The creation of a wholly-owned subsidiary in the inner city is not without prece-
dent. Perhaps the most well known project is Watts Manufacturing Company, estab-
lished by Aeroject General Manufacturing Company in the Watts district of Los Ange-
les. Formed after the Watts riots of 1965, Watts Manufacturing employs over 200
area residents who were selected without regard to education or past criminal records.
See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERcE, URBAN ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, CASE STUDY
No. 6, 1 (1968). Other large corporations have or will initiate similar projects:
-Westinghouse Electric Corp. plans a new factory in Pittsburgh's Home-
wood-Brushton Negro area that will turn out motorized personnel carriers
for use in industrial plants.
-Lockheed Aircraft Corp. is erecting a plant to make aircraft ground
support equipment in San Antonio's Mexican-American district. General Dy-
namics Corp. already has a new metal and woodworking operation there,
with products ranging from shipping pallets to aircraft structures.
-Avco Corp. is building a plant to handle the company's printing needs
in Boston's Roxbury Negro area. EG&G Inc.,.. is putting a metal fabri-
cation operation in the same neighborhood.
-International Business Machines Corp. will make computer cables in
a plant in Brooklyn's Bedford-Stuyvesant Negro ghetto.
-Brown Shoe Co. is planning to build a shoe plant in St. Louis' Jeff-
Vander-Lou slum area. Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1968, at 32, col. 1 (Midwest ed.).
Most of these projects have been developed through cooperation with local community
GHETTO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Such a subsidiary could be formed in the conventional way by creat-
ing a new corporation, "G Corporation," followed by a transfer of
assets and cash in exchange for stock and securities in the new corpo-
ration. Since X Corporation would control G Corporation immedi-
ately after the transfer, the exchange would not be a taxable event.'0
G Corporation would be eligible for assistance under the Manpower
Development and Training Act to help overcome initial costs of
hiring and training employees drawn from the inner city area."
organizations and are receiving government money under various training programs.
Many parent corporations plan to divest ownership and control of the ghetto facilities
to community residents. For example, EG&G plans to reduce its holdings in its Boston
ghetto plant to 50 percent in 20 years through distribution of stock for management
options, an employee stock purchase plan and a public offering to Roxbury residents.
Id.
1 0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 351 [hereinafter cited as CODE]. Section 351 pro-
vides that no gain shall be recognized upon a transfer of appreciated assets to a cor-
poration solely in exchange for stock or securities in the transferee corporation, provi-
ded that immediately after the transfer, the transferor is in "control" of the transferee
corporation. Control is defined as possession of at least 80 percent of the combined
voting power of all classes of voting stock and at least 80 percent of the total value of
all other shares. CODE § 368(c). Of course, if X Corporation should transfer only
cash to the ghetto subsidiary, there would be no potential gain, and thus no compelling
reason to meet the control requirements of section 351. Without the control strictures
of section 351, X Corporation might have more leeway to develop a plan for ultimate
divestiture of its G Corporation stock to community residents. However, where land or
other appreciated property is transferred to the ghetto subsidiary, section 351 treatment
will be desirable. In any event, the control requirements of section 351 will not pre-
sent an insurmountable obstacle to an effective divestiture plan. See notes 20-23 infra.
11 For a comprehensive analysis of the abnormally high labor costs involved with
operating a plant in a ghetto area, see Garrity, Red Ink for Ghetto Industties?, HARV.
Bus. REV., May-June, 1968, at 4. To compensate for the extra cost of training un-
skilled workers drawn from ghetto areas, private corporations are eligible for federal
grants under the Manpower Training and Development Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§
2571-2610 (Supp. 1969). Two programs have been implemented under this legisla-
tion. The older On-the-Job Training Program (OJT), 42 U.S.C. § 2584 (Supp. 1969),
makes up to $850 per trainee available to cover the cost of supportive services such as
remedial education- and extra job counseling which are necessary to make the hard
core fully productive. See Kalb, supra note 3, at 53. Contracts under the OJT pro-
gram are made with the Department of Labor, and must combine work with a "program
of occupational training" under which each trainee receives classroom instruction per-
taining to the particular occupation for which he is being trained. See 29 C.F.R. §
20.20 (1969).
The newer and more comprehensive job development program is Job Opportu-
nities in the Business Sector (JOBS), sponsored by the National Alliance of Business-
men headed by Henry Ford I. The key feature of the JOBS program is the fact that
trainees become employees of the participating employer upon entrance into the pro-
gram, and thus are assured of permanent employment at the completion of the train-
ing phase. Since all trainees become employees at the beginning of the training pro-
gram, they receive salaries and other employee benefits. The security of a permanent
job from the start of the training program has had a positive effect upon trainee moti-
vation. See DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 93 (1969).
The mechanics whereby a private corporation like X Corporation or its subsidiary can
secure a government contract under the JOBS program are outlined in JOBS, NA-
TIONAL ALLIANCE OF BusINEsSMEN, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL MA-4 (Labor Dept.
print.). All private companies, regardless of size, located in 50 designated cities
1969]
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Aside from providing immediate employment opportunities, G Cor-
poration would function as an industrial laboratory where, under
are eligible to participate in the JOBS program. For the listing of the specific cities,
which generally includes the 50 largest cities in the United States, see id. at 47. Fol-
lowing the prescribed format, an employer desiring to participate in the program sub-
mits to the regional manpower administrator a proposal contract wherein the employer
estimates the increased costs it will experience upon hiring disadvantaged individuals.
Such increased expenses would include the cost of:
a) Orientation
(1) medical and dental examination and services
(2) initial counseling
(3) basic job related orientation
b) Job Related Basic Education
(1) special counseling and testing
(2) Pre-vocational education
(3) basic skill preparation
c) On-the-Job Training
(1) Skill training
(2) special counseling and coaching
(3) wastage, equipment breakage
(4) productivity differential (additional costs resulting from less than "nor-
mal" trainee productivity)
d) Administrative Cost and Overhead
(1) transportation
(2) Supervisory and co-worker orientation
(3) general administration and overhead Id. at 3.
All of these services, except on-the-job skill training, may be subcontracted to qualified
public or private agencies. Individuals who are "poor persons who do not have suit-
able employment and who are either (1) school dropouts, (2) under 22 years of age,
(3) 45 years of age or over, (4) handicapped, or (5) subject to obstacles to employment"
are eligible to become employee-trainees upon certification by the Concentrated Em-
ployment Program. Id. at 51.
Once the cost estimates have been approved by the Labor Department, they are con-
verted into a fixed per trainee cost schedule which is incorporated into the contract.
The employer then files monthly invoices certifying the number of trainees participat-
ing in each cost classification over the relevant monthly period, and is reimbursed by
the government. Under JOBS program "Option B." a less complicated contract pro-
cedure is available for smaller employers. See id. at 23-35. For an extensive discussion
of various successful training programs, see Kalb, supra note 3; 2 GREENLEIGH ASSO-
CIATES, INC., OPENING THE DOORS: JOB TRAINING PROGRAMS 13 (1968); U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, URBAN ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, PHILADELPHIA UTIL-
ITY OFFERS JOBS TO MINORITIES (1968); Id., BOSTON FIRM MARKING TEN YEARS
OF SUCCESS IN HIRING HARD CORE; Id., BUFFALO EMPLOYS THE HARD CORE
wITH OPPORTUNITIES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; Borek, A New Business for
Business: Reclaiming Human Resources, 77 FORTUNE, Jan. 1968, at 159.
Although federal manpower grants will compensate for high labor turnover rates
and the costs of training, such grants will not compensate for other direct and indirect
costs which tend to be higher in inner city areas. When the high costs of land, insur-
ance, and taxes in the inner city are considered, formation of a ghetto subsidiary, even
with government training subsidies, does not present an extremely attractive invest-
ment from a strictly dollars-and-cents point of view. Moreover, the abnormally high
direct costs associated with the operation of a ghetto plant do not account for the indirect
opportunity costs involved with the loaning of executive talent to the inner city opera-
tion. Although the ghetto subsidiary may be of considerable public relations value to
the parent, and will pay a social dividend in the form of increased inner city affluence
and the preservation of civil tranquility, the parent cannot expect to receive an imme-
diate cash return on the ghetto investment which is competitive with alternative invest-
ment opportunities. In order to compensate for increased costs of operating a ghetto
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the direction of experienced X Corporation personnel, employee
skills could constantly be elevated.
Initially, the ghetto subsidiary would be heavily dependent up-
on X Corporation as a source of capital and managerial talent.
Whether it will also be dependent upon X Corporation as a major
buyer of its products will in most cases be determined 'by the nature
of X Corporation's business. For example, if X Corporation manu-
factures highly sophisticated electronic equipment, given the nature
of the ghetto subsidiary's workforce, it is unlikely that it can become
a major supplier. Even where X Corporation's production process
is such that the subsidiary could become a major supplier of an es-
sential item, X Corporation might be reluctant to rely on it as a
source of supply owing to the risks involved in such an operation.
However, where there are alternative suppliers for an essential item
to whom X Corporation could resort if the ghetto subsidiary were
unable to meet its needs, -the risks of a buyer-seller relationship
would be reduced.
Whether or not X Corporation enters into a buyer-seller relation-
ship with its ghetto subsidiary, it is dear that -the subsidiary must be
guaranteed a market for its output. If, as proposed, the subsidiary
is destined to 'become independent and self-sufficient, it should pro-
duce an item with general marketability and growth potential.
Moreover, the subsidiary's production process should be labor in-
tensive in order to maximize employment opportunities. Initially, X
Corporation might be the subsidiary's sole customer. After the
fledgling corporation becomes established, additional sales outlets
could be pursued. In this respect it should be noted that the federal
government gives special preference on government procurement
contracts to facilities located in areas of concentrated underemploy-
ment or unemployment.12
Following its original intention, when -the ghetto subsidiary ap-
proaches self-sufficiency, X Corporation will seek an appropriate
mechanism by which to divest itself of control.' 3 A likely vehicle
facility, and possibly to assuage shareholder opposition to ghetto involvement, the pa-
rent corporation may seek additional income tax benefits upon disposition of the inner
city operation. See notes 20-24 infra & accompanying text.
12 29 C.F.R. sections 8.1-.9 (1969), require the Secretary of Labor to classify as an
area of 'concentrated unemployment or underemployment" any city or labor area having
a population of 250,000 or more and a rate of unemployment of 6 percent or more.
Firms located in or near an area so classified, and which agree to hire from that area,
can apply for a certificate of eligibility entitling them to preference on government
procurement contracts. Id. § 8.8 Watts Manufacturing, discussed supra note 9, has
received extensive contracts to make tents and other equipment for the military.
13 It should be noted that an early disposition of the parent's equity interest in the
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for divestiture would be through stock distributions to the subsid-
iary's employees. A simple device would be for the ghetto subsid-
iary to issue new shares and distribute them either directly to its
employees as compensation,'4 or to a qualified profit sharing
trust.'" The subsidiary might also make a public offering to inner
city residents and combine its offering with a simultaneous redemp-
tion of shares from X Corporation. A gradual redemption of shares
from X Corporation would lead to adverse tax consequences since,
to the extent of the subsidiary's earnings and profits, X Corporation
would have to pay tax on any gain at ordinary income rates.16
However, X Corporation could receive capital gains treatment if
the subsidiary were to redeem X Corporation's entire interest in
exchange for the subsidiary's long term notes.'7  The subsidiary
could retire the shares redeemed or hold them as treasury stock and
resell the shares to the public or distribute them to employees.' 8 X
subsidiary by sale or gift will not jeopardize nonrecognition under the initial incorpo-
ration pursuant to Code section 351. This is so because the parent was in control of the
subsidiary "immediately after the transfer" of assets in exchange for stock and there was
no preexisting legal obligation to divest control. See Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942); W. M. Smith Electric Co., 5 54,199 P-H T.C.
Memo (1954).
14 In Rev. Rul. 69-75, 1969-8 IRB 9, the Revenue Service held that a corporate em-
ployer could deduct the fair market value of authorized but unissued shares distributed
by the corporation to its employees as compensation. The value of the stock distributed
to the employees would be taxable to them as compensation income under Code section
61, see Treas. Regs. § 1.61-2(d) (4) (1969). Employees drawn from the inner city.
however, may not have sufficient cash to pay the tax. Therefore, the tax should be
avoided by restricting the transferability of the shares or otherwise rendering the value
of the shares uncertain. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-2(d) (5), 1.421(6) (1969). The
value of the shares would then be taxable as compensation income to the employee when
the restriction lapses. See Rev. Rul. 68-86, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 184.
15 A profit-sharing trust qualifying under Code section 401 (a) is exempt from taxa-
tion under section 501(a). Although employer contributions of its own stock to the
profit sharing trust will not give employees legal title to the company's shares, it will
provide them with a beneficial interest in the profitability of the company and thereby
achieve the social benefits of community proprietorship. The subsidiary would be en-
tided to deduct the value of its stock contributions to the trust as compensation expenses
under Code section 162(a), not in excess of 15 percent of the aggregate regular compen-
sation paid to qualified employees, and the contributions would not be taxable to the
employees. CODE § 404(a) (3). Since the trust is tax exempt, it could sell the sub-
sidiary's shares to local community residents without capital gains tax and loan the pro-
ceeds from such sales to the subsidiary for working capital or expansion. Caution should
be exercised when the trust makes loans to the employer in order to insure that the trans-
action is one at "arms length," with adequate security and interest provisions.
16 See CODE §§ 317 (b), 302 (d), 301 (c), 316(a).
17 CODE § 302(b) (3). If X Corporation receives less than 30 percent of the fair
market value of the subsidiary's shares (exclusive of evidences of the subsidiary's in-
debtedness) in the year of sale, any gain could be reported on the installment method.
See CODE § 453.
1 8 In Rev. Rul. 62-217, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 59, the IRS held deductible as com-
pensation expenses the fair market value of treasury shares distributed to employees.
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Corporation could also secure capital gains treatment for any ap-
predation in the value of its G Corporation stock by making a
secondary distribution directly -to ghetto residents. 9
Most of the corporations interviewed in the Cleveland area in-
dicated that they did not want to tie up corporate capital in urban
improvement projects for extended periods. Although any num-
ber of conventional devices could be employed -by a parent corpo-
ration to divest itself of a ghetto subsidiary and thereby provide
the inner city residents with a proprietory interest in the productive
resources of -the community, the traditional divestiture mechanisms
would not allow the parent to effect a complete withdrawal, of in-
vested capital at an early date. It is unlikely that the ghetto sub-
sidiary could generate enough profits to redeem all of its shares
from the parent in the first few years of operation. Even where
the shares are redeemed for the subsidiary's notes, the parent's cap-
ital would still be locked into debt instruments which in all proba-
bility would not be marketable. Likewise, because of the ghetto
community's general lack of funds and the expected reluctance of
community residents to buy capital shares with what little money
they have, it is doubtful that the parent could dispose of its entire
holding of the subsidiary's stock through a public offering to inner
city residents without a sustained selling effort extending over a
number of years.
Given that the traditional divestiture mechanisms are inade-
quate to effect an early withdrawal of capital, the parent corpora-
19 Unless a specific exemption is available, distribution of a controlling block of
shares to ghetto residents would probably require registration with the Securities Ex-
change Commission pursuant to sections 5 and 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77(e), 11(b) (77), (1964). If the value of the offering is less than
$300,000, short form registration under Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263
(1968), would allow distribution through use of an offering circular rather than a full
fledged prospectus.
Since the inner city residents will be buying or subscribing for the shares of the
ghetto company, they are entitled to benefit from the full disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws. However, public distribution of shares in a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary as part of a comprehensive local urban development program presents a unique
situation. First, the distributing parent corporation is not motivated by the expectation
of profits on the offering, and will most likely suffer a pecuniary loss. Second, the de-
velopment program is inherently localized; the productive facility is situated in the com-
munity, and all prospective offerees of the securities are local residents. These factors
combine to make available a complete exemption from registration under section 3(a)
(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (11) (1964), which exempts
from registration securities "sold only to persons resident within a single State or Terri-
tory, where the issuer of such security . . . is . . . incorporated by and doing business
within, such State or Territory." For a detailed discussion of the "intrastate" exemption,
see 1 L LOSS, SEcuRrTEs REGULATION 591-605 (1961). Local state statutes should
be consulted with respect to Blue Sky registration requirements.
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bon might attempt to divest the subsidiary by gift if it could secure
a compensating tax benefit. 20  A recent revenue ruling indicates
that the parent might donate its subsidiary stock to a charitable
organization and take a charitable deduction equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the stock.2' The crucial question here would be
whether a corporation or foundation organized to receive stock in
a ghetto corporation, distribute the stock to disadvantaged minor-
ity and poverty groups, and reinvest the proceeds in similar ghetto
businesses, would be organized exclusively for "charitable" pur-
poses within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. The regulations define the word char-
itable broadly to include organizations formed "to lessen neighbor-
hood tensions" and "to combat community deterioration. 2113  In
Revenue Ruling 68-655, 24 the Revenue Service held that a nonpro-
fit organization formed to promote racial integration in housing, to
lessen neighborhood tensions, and to prevent neighborhood deteri-
oration which, among other activities, purchased homes to resell at
no profit on an open occupancy basis, was exempt under section
501 (c) (3). The ruling states that by purchasing homes in the
neighborhood and reselling at no profit to selected needy individ-
uals, the organization accomplished the charitable purposes of re-
ducing community tensions, stabilizing the neighborhood and com-
batting community deterioration.
The thrust of Revenue Ruling 68-655 is that the commercial
activity of selling 'homes to disadvantaged individuals in order to
preserve community stability and prevent deterioration is in fur-
therance of the organization's exempt purpose and hence not an
"unrelated trade or business." 5  The ruling recognized that home
20 Under the Community Self-Determination Act of 1968, X Corporation would re-
ceive substantial tax benefits upon the sale of a ghetto facility to a community-sponsored
development corporation. See notes 105-27 infra & accompanying text.
21 See Rev. Rul. 68-655, 1968-52 IRB 16, discussed in detail in note 24 infra &
accompanying text.
22 Under section 501 (c) (3), organizations formed exclusively for charitable pur-
poses are exempt from taxation.
2 3 Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (2) (1968).
24 1968-52 IRB 16.
2 5 Treas. Regs. section 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (1968), provides that an organization
may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) even though it carries on a trade or
business as a substantial part of its activities, if the trade or business is "in furtherance
of the organization's exempt purpose or purposes and the organization is not organ-
ized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business.
.. " Under Code section 513(a), unrelated trade or business is defined as any business
"not substantially related . . . to the exercise or performance" of the organization's ex-
empt purposes. To the extent that the receipt of shares in a ghetto corporation for the
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ownership will give disadvantaged minorities a vested proprietory
interest in the well being of the community and that an organiza-
tion promoting home ownership through the purchase and sale of
homes to selected buyers would operate to reduce tensions, pre-
serve stability, and prevent deterioration. Ownership and control
of the productive resources of the community would have the same
positive effect on community stability. Stock ownership, like home
ownership, would provide ghetto residents with a stake in the eco-
nomic prosperity of the community and thereby promote stability
and tend to prevent deterioration. Control over the productive
facilities of the community would 'break the ties of paternalistic de-
pendency and provide disadvantaged minorities with a new hope
for self-determination.
The most desirable exempt organization -to effect divestiture
would be a charitable development corporation which would hold
the shares in the ghetto subsidiary and embark on a program to edu-
cate inner city residents concerning the desirability of share owner-
ship. Such an educational effort would be necessary to dispel com-
munity ignorance and skepticism concerning corporate investment.
To overcome community reluctance to exchange money for share
certificates and intangible voting rights, the charitable corporation
might have to provide added security by guaranteeing repurchase of
the shares at the issuance price. The revenue derived from the sale
of shares could be combined with funds received through cash con-
tributions and used to loan money or make equity investments in
other independently owned ghetto businesses. 26 Since such invest-
purpose of sale to disadvantaged inner dry residents will operate to reduce community
tensions by stablizing the neighborhood and combatting community deterioration, such
sales would be in furtherance of an exempt purpose and therefore would not constitute
an unrelated trade or business. Because no part of the net earnings of an organization
qualifying for exemption under section 501(c)(3) may "inure to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual" (emphasis added), the charitable corporation distribut-
ing shares of local corporations must recoup the fair value of the stock upon sale to the
ghetto residents.
26The Inner City Business Improvement Forum, a nonprofit local development
corporation organized with the help of major Detroit corporations to aid businesses in
disadvantaged inner city areas, is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) and
would provide an ideal vehicle for divestiture of a gretto subsidiary. For a more de-
tailed discussion of the activities of the Detroit development corporation and similar ef-
forts by private businesses in other cities, see notes 83-90 infra & accompanying
text.
Perhaps the most far-reaching effort toward community ownership of productive
resources is Action Industries, Inc, a "ghetto conglomerate" located in the Venice area
of Los Angeles. Action Industries owns two service stations, a real estate development
company, a maintenance company, and is now planning to raise additional capital of $1
miUion through a private offering of 20,000 shares of convertible preferred at $25 per
share to corporations, institutions, and individuals. The firm of Kleiner, Bell and Coin-
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ment activity would be in furtherance of the organization's exempt
purpose of promoting community stability, it would not constitute
an unrelated trade or business. 27  Also, to the extent that invest-
ments in other community businesses provide new employment op-
portunities for disadvantaged ghetto residents and induce the influx
of new capital into the ghetto, the exempt organization would ac-
complish the additional charitable objectives of "[rJelief of the poor
and distressed or of the underprivileged, lessening the burdens of
government, [and] promotion of social welfare."28
Before the parent makes the contribution of the subsidiary's
stock to the nonprofit community development organization, the
latter -should apply to the Revenue Service for a ruling that it is ex-
empt from taxation as a charitable organization under section
501 (c) (3) :29 Exemption would insure a charitable deduction for
the parent corporation equal to the fair market value of the stock
contributed."0 Should the value of the subsidiary's stock contribu-
ted exceed 5 percent of -the parent corporation's taxable income for
the year, the parent would be entitled to a 5-year carryover.3'
Practically speaking, since the rate of corporate taxation is presently
about 52.8 percent for a corporation earning over $25,000, the char-
itable deduction allows the parent corporation to recoup only 52.8
percent of its -total investment in the ghetto subsidiary. Neverthe-
less, because the charitable deduction is equal to the full fair market
value of the stock contributed, the parent corporation will save the
capital gains tax which it would have been required to pay had it
sold -the stock outright. This tax savings, equal to the capital gains
tax on the amount by which the present value of the subsidiary's
pany is underwriting the issue without fee and has estimated that the entire offering is
assured of placement. See THE URBAN DEVELOPER, Vol. 1, No. 2, at 2 (pub. by Hyde
Park Bank & Trust Co., Feb. 1969). Action Industries will raise another $500,000
through a public offering of 250,000 shares of Class A common at $2 per share to local
residents. In order to insure community control, 500,000 shares of Class B common
will be issued to Project Action, a nonprofit community organization which will vote
the Class B shares to elect the board of directors. Id. A nonprofit community owner-
ship organization similar to Project Action that would qualify as a section 501(c)(3)
organization would provide a convenient vehicle through which X Corporation could
divest its ghetto subsidiary.
27 The investment activities of the charitable development corporation would
closely parallel the activities of the Detroit organization which has been held exempt
under Code section 501(c)(3). See notes 86-87 infra & accompanying text.
28 Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (2) (1968).
29 For the proper application procedure, see Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (a) -1 (1968).
30 CODE § 170(b) (2).
31 Id. The parent corporation could spread the contribution of the subdidiary's
stock over several years if necessary to secure a maximum deduction.
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stock exceeds the parent's cost basis,82 must be considered when de-
termining the true value of the charitable deduction. If the parent
had transferred low basis, appreciated property to the subsidiary
pursuant to the initial incorporation under section 351,33 there
would be a considerable tax savings thereby making the charitable
deduction more attractive. 4
B, Unilateral Aid to Independent Ghetto Businesses
Rather than forming a wholly owned subsidiary in the ghetto
and transferring ownership through divestiture, X Corporation
could accomplish the objectives of encouraging ghetto entrepreneur-
ship and promoting community ownership by aiding independent
ghetto businesses. Two methods of involvement would be the re-
vitalization of existing businesses with government and corporate
money, and the creation of new independent ghetto corporations
with capital derived from government loans.
Several ways are available by which capital can be secured for
existing ghetto businesses. Because of their small size and in-
dependent ownership, these companies will be eligible for federal
loan assistance from the Small Business Administration (SBA).
Working in conjunction with the SBA, X Corporation would be
able to aid more than just one or two small businesses in the ghetto
area. The availability of SBA loans and loan guarantees would re-
duce the demands on X Corporation's capital, and thus permit it to
supply counseling services to a larger number of businesses. More-
over, by asserting its influence in the business community, X Cor-
poration could procure supply contracts from other corporations as
well as secure greater participation by banks and other financial in-
stitutions, thereby maximizing SBA participation.85  Hopefully, X
Corporation's activities would act as a catalyst for the involvement
3 2 Pursuant to the initial incorporation under Code section 351, the parent would
have a cost basis in the subsidiary stock equal to its adjusted basis in the property orig-
inally transferred. See CODE § 358.
3 3 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
34 Since Code sections 1245 & 1250 apply only to sales of tangible depreciable per-
sonal property and depreciable realty respectively, there would be no "recapture" of de-
preciation upon the gift of the subsidiary's shares to a charity via reduction in the amount
of the charitable deduction called for under Code section 170(e) for gifts of tangible
depreciable property.
35 Securing the commitment of commercial banks will be vital to the success of any
development effort. SBA funds for direct loans are limited, and the real infusion of cap-
ital into the inner city economy must come from traditional banking sources. Unfor-
tunately, banks as a whole have been noticeably reluctant to loan money to high risk
small businesses in ghetto areas, even where SBA loan guarantees are available. See
McKersie, Vitalize Black Enterprise, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1968 at 88. How-
ever, where established companies have taken the initiative to support inner city busi-
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 825
of a broad cross section of the business community in the develop-
ment effort.
With its power to make and guaranty substantial loans, the
Small Business Administration constitutes a major source of capital.
The SBA is authorized to loan up to $350,000 to small business con-
cerns for the financing of plant construction or rehabilitation, for
the purchase of equipment, and for working capital purposes where
conventional financing is not available.3 6  Traditionally, the SBA
has been extremely conservative in selecting loan recipients. To
overcome this conservatism and to open the door for increased fed-
eral aid to businesses located in areas of substantial unemployment,
Congress enacted legislation in 1967 calling on the SBA to give spe-
cial consideration to small business concerns located in urban or
rural areas with high proportions of unemployed or low-income in-
dividuals, and particularly to small business concerns owned by low-
income individuals.17  This legislation also authorizes Economic Op-
portunity Loans (EOL's). 38 As with regular SBA loans, EOL's are
made on a direct loan, guarantee, or participation basis, and are
available only when funds cannot 'be obtained on reasonable terms
from traditional sources.8 9 Although the credit requirements for an
nesses by guaranteeing them a market for their products and agreeing to supply expert
business guidance, the credit risks associated with ghetto businesses are reduced consider-
ably, and the banks have been more responsive to inner city needs. In Rochester, New
York, major corporations have formed a development company to assist ghetto busi-
nesses, and have been highly successful in securing the participation of commercial
banks. See notes 75-82 infra.
Acting in response to increased support for ghetto entrepreneurs from major Chicago
businesses, the Hyde Park National Bank and Trust Company formed an Urban Devel-
opment Division last spring. The special division is designed to make loans to inner
city small businessmen and provide mortgage financing for home acquisition and re-
habilitation. The development division is complete with an applicant screening depart-
ment and a business counselling and guidance department to aid ghetto businesses once
credit has been extended. The extra costs of administering the program are assumed by
major corporations who have agreed to take smaller interest payments on their own
time deposits held by the bank. As of February, 1969, the development division had
loaned $754,050 to 25 ghetto businesses in the west and south sides of Chicago. See
THE URBAN DEVELOPER, Vol. 1, No. 2, at I (pub. by Hyde Park Nat'l Bank, Feb.
1969).
36 15 U.S.C.A. § 636 (1964). See 13 C.F.R. §§ 122.1-16 for the administrative
regulations. The SBA will provide direct loans where other financing is not available
on reasonable terms, and these loans may be obtained by qualified small businesses
without the participation of banks. Id. at §§ 120.2, 122.8. The borrower, however,
must be a "small business concern." Id. at §§ 121.3-.3-14 (1969). Further credit re-
quirements are that the borrower be of good character, have ability to operate the busi-
ness successfully, and have enough capital so that the business has a reasonable chance
for success so as to insure that the loan will be repaid. Id. at § 122.16.
37 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-05 (Supp. 1969).
3842 U.S.C.A. § 2902 (Supp. 1969); 13 C.F.R. § 119.1-.81 (1969).
39 Id.
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EOL are less stringent,4 ° the amount of the loan is limited to a max-
imum of $25,000.1 There are no specific collateral requirements
for an EOL, but the applicant may be required to pledge whatever
worthwhile collateral is available.42  Furthermore, in order to re-
ceive an EOL, at least 50 percent of the business must be owned by
low-income groups;43 and to insure the success of the business, SBA
may require the borrower to participate in an approved management
training program." The maximum interest rate permitted on an
EOL ,is 5 1/2 percent, and it can be as low as 4 5/8 percent for bus-
inesses located in redevelopment areas.45 The SBA will also guar-
antee a lease of commercial and industrial property made by a small
business concern otherwise unable to obtain a lease, because of its
poor credit standing.46 Thus, by operating in conjunction with
SBA, X Corporation can undertake a number of meaningful pro-
grams to revitalize dormant or struggling inner city businesses.
On the other hand, X Corporation could engage in the creation
of new ghetto corporations. Once X has located an aspiring entre-
preneur from the inner city,47 it can employ its legal talent -to create
4 0 To be eligible for an EOL, the borrower must be of good character, have shown
ability to operate the business successfully, and have enough capital that with the
EOL there is a reasonable chance that the business will succeed and that the loan will be
repaid. 13 C.F.R. § 51 (1969).
4142 U.S.C.A. 2902 (Supp. 1969). The EOL program is divided into two parts.
"EOL I" and "EOL II." EOL I is designed to aid people already in business where
business income provides the owner with only a marginal existence. EOL II is designed
to aid existing businesses which, although profitable, have been unable to secure ade-
quate financing for expansion. See The Chance to Do..., Economic Opportunity Loan
Programs EOL 1, EOL 2, (SBA print. 1967).
42 13 C.F.R. § 119.31(d) (1969).
43Id. § 119.21(b) (1969).
44 42 U.S.C.A. § 2902 (Supp. 1969). It should be noted, however, that SBA will
finance management training courses given by public or private organizations. Id. §
2906(b); 13 C.F.R. § 119.81 (1969).
45 These areas are so designated under the Public Works and Economic Develop-
ment Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3121 (Supp. 1969); 13 C.F.R. §§ 301.1-.63 (1969).
46 15 U.S.C.A. § 692 (Supp. 1969). The SBA guarantee insures payment of rent
directly or in participation with private insurance companies. The guarantee extends
for a minimum of 5 years to a maximum of 20 years on a participating basis, and 15 to
20 years on a direct basis. See generally 13 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-.7 (1969).
47 locating a ghetto entrepreneur may present a difficult problem for white busi-
nessmen. SBA has recently instituted a program known as "Project Own" under
which teams of SBA personnel are actively seeking out qualified businessmen from
inner city areas. Private companies seeking involvement in a ghetto project might
consult SBA as a first step in locating a qualified inner city businessman. For a more
detailed discussion of SBA Project Own, see notes 54-56 infra.
To facilitate the location of qualified individuals in ghetto areas, Detroit business-
men have worked through various community organizations which act as a liaison be-
tween the white corporate establishment and the ghetto community. See notes 89-90
infra & accompanying text.
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the fledgling corporation while it trains the future businessman in a
managerial program.48  A large part of the initial financing could
come from SBA loans, although X Corporation might also lend
money, guarantee 'the SBA loan, or -take an equity position in the
new corporation.49 X might also assist in creating lines of credit
to the ghetto business from prospective suppliers of materials and
services as well as guaranteeing the new business a market by agree-
ing to buy its products, while at the same time exerting its influence
in the business community to secure other buyersY0
4 8 In 1967, Eastman Kodak Company of Rochester, New York, conducted a series
of studies to determine how it might aid in the creation of independently owned busi-
nesses in Rochester's inner city area. The results of these investigations are contained
in a booklet entitled A Plan for Establishing Independently Owned and Operated Busi-
nesses in Inner City Areas, published by Eastman in 1967. The booklet recommended
the creation of a community investment company to be sponsored by a number of area
corporations. 'The Eastman study came to fruition in January, 1968, with formation of
the Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation (RBOC) which will be analyzed in
greater detail in the latter part of this Note. See notes 75-82 infra & accompanying
text. The Kodak study recommends that a new ghetto business should have the fol-
lowing characteristics:
1. The first product need not require a high level of technical skill to man-
ufacture, but the type of skill required initially should lead to the acquisi-
tion of higher levels of skill.
2. The product should be marketable to a range of customers. An excli-
sive dependence on just one customer is undesirable. Such dependence limits
the growth possibilities of business while increasing its risks.
3. The initial capital investment should be relatively small. A product or
service with a high labor content in its manufacture tends to generate more
jobs ....
4. The extent to which employees of existing businesses - particularly local
ones - would be hurt by new competition must be considered. To create a
new enterprise which would only replace existing jobs in successful and es-
tablished business would not be desirable. This would negate one of the ma-jor goals: that is, the creation of new job opportunities and new wealth.
5. A single enterprise might ultimately have several product lines. This
would spread the business risk and enhance the opportunities. Thus, it is con-
ceivable that there might be one section devoted to sub-assembly work on elec-
tronic components, another to repair and service, and another to the fabri-
cation of a finished product.
49 The Kodak study, supra note 48, suggests that about 45 percent of initial capital
could be provided by SBA loans, and that the remaining 55 percent of the total should
be equity capitalization. Ten percent of the total equity capitalization should be
raised by the ghetto entrepreneurs, and X Corporation would supply the balance of the
equity capital. With a total capitalization of $100,000, $45,000 would come from the
SBA, $10,000 from the ghetto entrepreneurs, and $45,000 from X Corporation. It
is further recommended that the shares issued to X Corporation be redeemable by the
ghetto business thereby allowing it to become totally independent at a future time.
50 It is vitally important that the new ghetto company be guaranteed a market for
its products in the critical early years of operation. Supply contracts from major cor-
porations will shelter the fledgling company during its infancy until it can become fully
competitive. However, as pointed out by the Eastman Kodak study, supra note 48, be-
fore inner city businesses receive substantial preferential treatment from other large
corporations, the impact on existing competition must be considered. For example,
were X Corporation to enter into a long term requirements contract with a ghetto com-
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Once the ghetto corporation was assured of a market for its
products, it might be sufficiently secure to receive bank credit. The
pany, independent producers would be foreclosed from selling to X Corporation for
an extended period. Likewise, where several large buyers of a given product discrim-
inate in favor of ghetto businesses in the selection of suppliers, and also extend counsel-
ing services and preferential credit terms to inner city businesses, the competitive pos-
ition of independent producers of that product may be injured. It is also suggested that
X corporation exert its influence in the business community to secure purchase con-
tracts for the ghetto concern from other large companies. Cf. Davis, The Role of Private
Industry in Aiding the Poor, 19 VA. L. WEEK. 104, 108 (1968), where it is noted that
in January, 1968, the president of Neiman-Marcus Co., a large Dallas retailer, sent a
letter to the company's 9000 suppliers saying that "We shall in our purchasing activities
look with favor upon those companies taking positive steps toward employing and
training people of minority groups." The question arises whether the application of
this kind of economic leverage, combined with other preferential treatment accorded
inner city businesses, may run afoul of the antitrust laws; for although securing the
economic independence of disadvantaged minorities is a noble goal, the adverse impact
on competition may be very real.
The fact that X Corporation and its own competitors combine to aid ghetto busi-
nesses should not be construed as a combination in restraint of trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). "Unlike the typical object of anti-
trust attack, these are actions contrary to the pecuniary interests of the parties concerned
and thus do not pose the dangers normally associated with collaboration among com-
petitors." Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L REV. 1207, 1210 (1969). Although Professor Turner (former Chief Coun-
sel of the Justice Department Antitrust Division) directed this observation to the poten-
tially anti-competitive relationship between competitors who engage in a joint venture
to aid urban development, the same absence of pecuniary reward to X Corporation per-
vades the entire plan to aid inner city businesses, and this fact. combined with the
social benefits produced, should be given great weight when subjecting the plan to scru-
tiny under the antitrust laws. Thus, although a long term contract whereby X Corpo-
ration agrees to buy all its requirements of a given product from a ghetto company might
foreclose other sellers from selling to X Corporation, there would be no violation of
section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 14 (1964), because of the public purpose which
the contract serves. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
Similarly, although the use of economic leverage by X Corporation to induce its other
suppliers to buy from the ghetto concern has overtones of "reciprocity," there would be
no violation of the Clayton Act since X Corporation receives no pecuniary benefit as a
result of the reciprocal agreement or understanding. In any event, it is dear from the
Tampa case and the express wording of the statute that there can be no violation of sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act unless the plan to aid a ghetto business results in a "substantial"
lessening of competition. Given the small size of the ghetto operations, it would ap-
pear that the potentially anticompetitive effects would not be sufficiently substantial to
support a Clayton Act violation.
Nevertheless, even if the foreclosure effects of the exclusive dealing requirements
contract or the application of economic leverage to induce X Corporation's other sup-
pliers to buy from the ghetto company are not likely to substantially injure competition,
these activities might constitute an "unfair trade practice" under Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). In such case, X Corporation should be advised
to seek an advisory opinion from the Federal Trade Commission. See discussion of FTC
Act § 5 infra. Even though an agreement among X Corporation and its competitors
to buy from and give preferential treatment to selected ghetto businesses has overtones
of price fixing and market allocation, there would be no violation of the Sherman Act
because the parties to the agreement or understanding receive no pecuniary benefit.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), prohibits price discrimination,
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), prevents
unfair trade practices and methods of competition. Conceivably, the plan to aid ghetto
business might infringe the letter of these prohibitions, if X Corporation plans to sell
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new corporation would also have preference on government con-
tracts, 51 and in this respect recent legislation orders the SBA to se-
sure government contracts and subcontracts for small businesses re-
ceiving SBA loan funds. Aside from securing start-up capital
and guaranteeing the new corporation a market for its production,
X Corporation's real contribution would be in the form of special-
ized counseling advice on proper business techniques. Without ex-
pert guidance in such essential matters as marketing, accounting,
and cost control, the new ghetto corporation would not be success-
ful. Although the government can supply seed capital and provide
an outlet for production, it does not have 'the necessary business ex-
pertise to give continuous advice and counsel on proper business
methods.52  It is in this essential area that private corporations can
products to the ghetto operation on favorable terms. Recently, however, the Federal
Trade Commission, which has broad powers under both statutes, has indicated that it
will not attack plans to discriminate in favor of ghetto businesses. In an Advisory Opin-
ion issued on May 25, 1968, Advisory Opinion Digest No. 253, 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 5 18,358, at 20,728 (1968), the FTC held that an apparel manufacturer's plan to
give extended preferential credit terms to ghetto businesses owned by local residents
would not infringe Clayton Act section 2, and would not constitute an unfair trade prac-
tice under FTC Act section 5. Implicit in the opinion is the recognition by the FTC that
some anticompetitive effects may be a necessary quid pro quo for economic and social
progress. Cf. Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. 1969), which
provides that a merger between banks having significant anticompetitive effects will not
be held unlawful under Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), where the anticompeti-
tive effects of the merger are "clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served." Id. § 1828 (c) (5) (B). However, the Commission's advisory opinion is predi-
cated upon a finding that ghetto retailers did not compete with other clothing stores.
Also, the FTC required that the manufacturer submit a report to the Commission one
year after the date the plan to give discriminatory credit terms was initiated, indicating
that it intends to keep such plans under scrutiny. Given the limited scope of the Ad-
visory Opinion 253 and the FTC's retention of jurisdiction, X Corporation should be
advised to seek FTC approval before embarking on a plan to sell to ghetto businesses on
favorable terms which it does not offer to other customers.
5142 U.S.C.A. § 2906(c) (A) (Supp. 1969); 15 U.S.C.A. § 637 (1964).
52 Many of the corporations surveyed in the Cleveland area were supplying the ser-
vices of executive personnel to a number of ghetto businesses, and several corporations
had assigned executives to devote substantial amounts of company time to work on var-
ious urban development projects. One frequently asked question was whether the
salaries paid to corporate personnel devoting such time to urban programs should be
treated as business expenses for tax purposes or whether some other treatment is called
for under the tax law.
Under Code section 1 6 2(a), every employer is entitled to an ordinary and necessary
expense deduction for compensation paid to employees. The deduction is subject to
two basic limitations: it must be reasonable in amount in light of the nature and extent
of the services rendered, and the services must actually have been rendered to the em-
ployer. Treas. Regs. § 1.162-7 (1968). Assuming that the amount of compensation
paid to executives who are loaned to ghetto businesses is reasonable, it must be deter-
mined whether the services are rendered "to the employer." Where the ghetto business
is intended to become a supplier of goods or services, the loaning corporation has a
genuine business interest in the success of the ghetto operation and the quality of its
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make the greatest contribution toward vitalizing the inner city econ-
omy.53
Additionally, it should be noted that SBA has recently begun
to actively seek the participation of individual private corporations
in ghetto development efforts. The 1967 legislation authorizing
the SBA to make EOL's provided the impetus for Project Own. In-
itiated in the summer of 1968, Project Own is an agency-wide pro-
gram designed to encourage minority entrepreneurship in economi-
cally depressed areas." The key feature of the program is -the fact
that SBA is actively seeking assistance from the private sector -
from banks to provide financial assistance, and from industry to
provide management and technical assistance to newly created
ghetto businesses. To locate potential entrepreneurs in the ghetto,
product or service. Thus, where the loaning corporation expects to enter into a business
relationship with the ghetto company, executive counseling services rendered to the
ghetto firm would result in a direct benefit to the loaning corporation and hence the
services should be considered as rendered "to the employer." Where, however, there
is no expectation that the loaning corporation will enter into a business relationship
with the inner city business, the pecuniary benefit to the employer flowing from the do-
nation of services becomes remote. It might be argued, however, that salaries paid to
loaned executives in such a situation are in respect of past or future services and de-
ductible on that basis. Cf. Ware Knitters v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 208 (Ct. Cl.
1968). To the extent that the loaning corporation's efforts to help ghetto entrepre-
neurs increase its public image, salaries paid to loaned executives might be treated as
public relations expenses. Moreover, where the loaning corporation is situated close
to the ghetto area such that it will benefit directly from the quieting effect that ghetto
entrepreneurship will have on the potential for civil unrest, the salaries paid might be
deductible as expenses for the protection of business operations.
As a practical matter, however, it is unlikely that the Revenue Service will attack the
deduction where executives spend a few hours of company time per week assisting a ghet-
to entrepreneur. Where company personnel are spending substantial amounts of time
aiding inner city businesses, it is probably necessary for the employer to show some ex-
pectation of financial benefit to stay within the theoretical limits of the compensation
expense deduction. In view of the great social benefit to be derived from such assist-
ance, it seems highly unlikely that the IRS will attack the deduction in either case. For
a discussion of the deductibility of salaries paid to employees while they are working for
a charitable development organization see note 93 intra.
53 Negro businessmen are particularly in need of expert advice on business tech-
niques. For many reasons, largely a result of the fact that the blacks have been ex-
cluded from the business world, they lack managerial skills and attitudes. For an analy-
sis of these difficulties and some suggestions as to how they may be overcome, see Mc-
Kersie, supra note 35, at 88.
In recent years, large corporations have experienced difficulty in recruiting top
students from the prestigious colleges and universities. Increasingly, these socially con-
scious students have turned to more rewarding jobs in government or have gone into
teaching. Therefore, one ancillary benefit of corporate involvement in urban develop-
ment might be to change the image of a corporate career and make it more attractive to
to better students.
54 Much of the information concerning Project Own has been taken from an address
by Bernard Kulik, SBA director for the City of Detroit, given before the Institute of
Continuing Legal Education Conference on Inner City Businesses, Detroit, Michigan,
March 21, 1969.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 825
SBA has created "ME" (minority entrepreneurship) teams in 28 lo-
cations, primarily in large cities. These teams work closely with
community organizations to find potential or existing small busi-
nessmen in ghetto areas. Once -these are located, SBA acts as a cat-
alyst for the participation of private institutions in getting a new
business going or revitalizing an existing business. Since SBA funds
for direct loans are limited, the agency uses its guarantee powers to
secure loans from banks. Private equity investment in individual
ghetto businesses can be as little as 1 percent, and this "equity" can
be in the form of a loan if it is subordinated to the SBA financing.
In addition to providing financing, the SBA has been recruiting
private corporations to supply necessary management and -technical
advice to the ghetto businesses. Although Project Own is still in its
infancy, it has met with some success. For the 6-month period end-
ing in February, 1969, Project Own secured $1,755,446 in financial
assistance for minority-owned businesses in Cleveland, Ohio.5" By
providing -the organization to seek out and screen potential business-
men in ghetto areas, Project Own affords private industry a unique
opportunity for meaningful involvement in community devel-
opment programs. 56
C. Multilateral Aid to Independent Ghetto Businesses
In large metropolitan areas, unilateral projects involving direct
transfers of assets and counseling services to ghetto businesses by
individual corporations acting independently may not be practi-
cal.57  The magnitude and complexity of today's urban problems
probably require a cooperative effort by a broad cross-section of in-
dustry. By pooling their capital resources and diversity of special-
ized talents, several corporations working together through a non-
profit intermediary investment or development corporation can
mount a broad-based attack on urban problems. Such a coopera-
tive program would allow the full participation of corporations too
small to initiate independent development projects.
55 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 30, 1969, § A, at 25, col. 1. The Cleveland effort
has made use of SCORE (Service Corps of Retired Executives), an SBA sponsored pro-
gram which draws upon the talents of retired businessmen to provide free (except for
direct expenses) business advice to inner city companies.
56 One largely undeveloped area for ghetto enterpreneurship is the establishment of
franchised retail outlets and eating places in the inner city. National franchising com-
panies operate with controlled buying procedures and have well-developed training and
supervisory programs and thus are well suited to guide inexperienced minority group
businessmen.
57 The consensus among the corporations surveyed in the Cleveland area was that
unilateral programs by single corporations would not be effective.
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(i) Formation of a Section 502 Development Company.- An
extremely effective vehicle for assisting ghetto businesses would
be a nonprofit development corporation chartered under section 502
of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958.8 Such a develop-
ment company is an enterprise incorporated under state law, formed
for the purpose of furthering the economic development of the com-
munity, having the authority to promote and assist the growth and
development of small businesses in the area.59 Although a develop-
ment company may be organized either as a profit or a nonprofit
enterprise,60 private corporations contemplating the development
corporation as a vehicle to channel capital into the ghetto would or-
dinarily prefer the nonprofit variety in order to secure additional
tax benefits. 61
To form such a development corporation, X and other area cor-
porations would contribute cash to the development company which
in turn would make loans, loan guarantees, and equity investments
in ghetto businesses. Under section 502 of the 1958 Investment
Company Act, 12 the development corporation would be eligible for
SBA loans up to $350,000 to finance plant construction, conversion,
or expansion, including the acquisition of land, for each specific
"identifiable" ghetto businesses receiving assistance. 3 Although
SBA money is not available for working capital under the section
502 program, the necessary operating funds could be provided from
the development company's own resources or from local banks. In
depressed areas, the development corporation could secure SBA fi-
nancing for up to 90 percent of the amount required to finance each
identifiable small business.64
The development corporation would act as a clearinghouse for
essential technical assistance and advisory services, secure the par-
ticipation of banks and other financial institutions, and help to ar-
range purchase contracts between participating corporations and the
assisted ghetto businesses. The involvement of established busi-
nesses in the cooperative development effort would also stimulate
the creation of new business opportunities for the inner city com-
panies. Ultimately, the development corporation might divest its
5815 U.S.C.A. §§ 695-96 (1964).
5913 C.F.R. § 108.2(d) (1969).
60 Id.
61 See notes 66-74 supra & accompanying text.
62 15 U.S.C.A. § 696 (1964).
63 1d.; 13 C.F.R. § 108.502 (1969).
64 13 C.F.R. § 108.502-1 (e) (1969).
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equity holdings in various ghetto corporations in much the same
manner as X Corporation proposed to spin-off its wholly-owned
ghetto subsidiary through a charitable entity,65 and thereby broaden
community participation.
Organized exclusively for the purpose of promoting the eco-
nomic and social stability of the community by encouraging minor-
ity and poverty group entrepreneurship, reducing unemployment,
and facilitating community ownership of productive resources, the
nonprofit development corporation would qualify for tax exemp-
tion under section 501 (c) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code," as a
social welfare organization,6 7 or under section 501 (c) (6) as a busi-
ness league or chamber of commerce.68 Business contributions to
the nonprofit development corporation exempt under either provi-
sion would be fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under' section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code.69
6 5 See notes 21-34 supra & accompanying text.
66 CODE § 501 (c) (4). Section 501 (c) (4) exempts from taxation organizations not
organized for profit and operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. A
social welfare organization is one "operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about
civic betterments and social improvements." Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (4) -1 (a) (2) (i)
(1968).
67 Rev. Rul. 67-294, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 193; Rev. Rul. 64-187, 1964-1 CUM.
BULL. 187; I.T. 3706, 1945-2 CUM. BULL. 87.
6 8 CODE § 501(c)(6) exempts from taxation "business leagues and chambers of
commerce, not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of private shareholders." The Rochester Business Opportunities Corpora-
tion (RBOC), a section 502 development company organized to assist inner city busi-
nesses in the Rochester, New York, area, is exempt under Code section 501 (c) (6). Let-
ter from Leonard S. Zartman, Legal Dep't, Eastman Kodak Co., to Case Vestern Reserve
Law Review, Jan. 24, 1969. For a more detailed discussion of the RBOC, see notes
75-82 in/ra & accompanying text.
69 Private industry has a vested business interest in the economic prosperity and
civil tranquility of the community in which it is located. The presence of a vast slum
in the inner city, characterized by substandard and dilapidated housing, high rates of
crime, unemployment, and underemployment creates a volatile environment which
is not conducive to efficient business operations. Thus, area corporations have a
genuine business and interest in eliminating the underlying causes of poverty and the
potential for civil unrest, and expenditures made in that direction are in the nature of
business costs. A series of revenue rulings provides ample authority for the proposi-
tion that business contributions to a nonprofit investment corporation organized to
eliminate unemployment and promote industrial development are deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses.
In 1945, the Revenue Service ruled that business contributions to a post-war devel-
opment fund, organized primarily to "'promote the economic, industrial, and agricul-
tural welfare of M County so that opportunities for employment will be provided for
returning men and women'' were fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. I.T. 3706, 1945-2 CUM. BULL. 87. After announcing the general rule that
contributions to development organizations are deductible expenses where "the con-
tribution is made for a bona fide business purpose and is reasonably calculated to
further the business of the contributor," the Service stated: "It is the desire of the
Bureau that its policy with respect to the treatment of such contributions be as liberal
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Given the broad definition of charitable organization under the in-
come tax law, 70 the nonprofit development corporation exempt un-
der section 501(c) (4) might also qualify for exemption under sec-
tion 501 (c) (3) as a charitable corporation, in which case corporate
contributions would be deductible under section 170(b) (2) as
charitable contributions.71  Under the latter section, annual corpo-
rate charitable contributions are limited to 5 percent of taxable in-
come, but there is a 5-year carryover of unused deductions.72 Ex-
as possible, consistent with the statute." Id. Implicit in this broad statement of policy
is the IRS's recognition that business expenditures which promote social welfare as well
as selfish, profit-oriented interests are properly within the purview of "ordinary and
necessary."
In 1964, the Service ruled that a nonprofit corporation formed to aid and promote
the purposes of the Area Redevelopment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2501 (1964), qualified
for federal tax exemption under Code section 501(c)( 4), and that business contri-
butions to it were fully deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Rev.
Rul. 64-187, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 187. The purpose of the Area Redevelopment Act is
to "overcome unemployment and accompanying hardship and wasting of vital humafi
resources" by facilitating the "financing of projects for the purchase and development
of land, or facilities for industrial and commercial usage in areas that have substantial
and persistent unemployment or underemployment and which have been designated as
'redevelopment areas' by the Secretary of Commerce." Id.
In Revenue Ruling 67-294, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 193, a nonprofit organization
created to make loans to business entities as an inducement to locate in an economically
depressed area in order to alleviate unemployment -was held exempt as a "social wel-
fare" organization under Code section 501(c)(4). The ruling stated that "[bly en-
couraging industry to settle in an economically depressed area, the organization is
helping to alleviate unemployment and is being operated to bring about civic better-
ment and sodal improvement." Id. Although the Service did not address itself to the
question of whether business contributions to the organization would be deductible
business expenses, Revenue Ruling 67-294 specifically cites and follows Revenue Rul-
ing 64-187, supra, where contributions to a similar organization were held deductible
under Code section 162(a). It is clear from these authorities that business contribu-
tions to the proposed section 502 development company would be fully deductible.
70 Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (2) defines charitable purpose to include "[rje-
lief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; ... lessening of the burdens
of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed ... to lessen
neighborhood tensions ... or ... to combat community deterioration .... " Directly or
indirectly, the proposed development corporation, by promoting community stability
through investments in ghetto businesses, would accomplish all of the above charitable
objectives outlined in the regulations. See notes 23-25 supra & accompanying text.
71A "social welfare" organization exempt under section 501(c)(4) will qualify for
exemption as a charitable organization "if it falls within the definition of 'charitable'
set forth in paragraph (d) (2) of § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 and is not an 'action' organization as
set forth in paragraph (c) (3) of § 1.501 (c) (3)-1." Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (4)-
1 (a) (2) (1968). The development corporation would not be involved in politics or
in attempts to influence legislation, and therefore would not be an "action" organization
as defined in Treas. Regs. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (c) (3) (1968). Hence, it would qualify
for charitable status under Code section 501 (c) (3). See note 25 supra.
Since the commercial activities of loaning money to ghetto business and/or buying
stock in such companies would be in furtherance of the development corporation's ex-
empt purposes, such activity would not constitute an "unrelated trade or business."
See Treas. Regs. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (e) (1) (1968).
72 CODE § 170(b) (2).
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emption under section 501(c) (3) would thus allow nonbusiness
contributors a charitable deduction under section 170 and would al-
so render the development corporation eligible to receive grants
from large charitable foundations. 73  Of course, contributing corpo-
rations would be entitled to only one deduction for amounts con-
tributed during the taxable year, and if the development corpora-
tion qualifies as a charitable organization, contributing companies
would be forced to take a charitable deduction and could not take a
business expense deduction. 4
Under the leadership of Eastman Kodak Company, a section
502 development corporation known as the Rochester Business Op-
portunities Corporation (RBOC) has been formed by major busi-
nesses in Rochester, New York, for the purpose of assisting new
and existing businesses owned and operated by minority group per-
sons in 'the city's ghetto area.75  The RBOC is organized as a non-
profit membership corporation with no stock issued, and is exempt
from taxation under section 501 (c) (6) as a business league. 76 Con-
tributions to the RBOC have been held tax deductible as ordinary
73For a discussion of recent contributions by the Ford Foundation to urban devel-
opment projects in various cities, see note 79 infra. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1968, at 1, col. 7.
74 CODE § 162(b) provides that no deduction may be taken under section 162(a) for
any contribution or gift which would be allowable as a deduction under section 170
(charitable deduction) were it not for the percentage limitations provided in section 170.
In view of the percentage limitations placed on charitable contributions, it would ap-
pear that a non-charitable development corporation organized as a social welfare organ-
ization or a business league would provide a more expedient tax vehicle for channeling
private business capital into the ghetto. The Rochester development program com-
bines a tax exempt business league with a charitable foundation, and thereby maximizes
tax benefits by taking advantage of both charitable and business expense deductions.
See notes 76-82 infra & accompanying text.
75 The RBOC, organized on January 26, 1968, represents the culmination of a long
period of tension between the inner city community and big businesses in Rochester.
The initial impetus for the creation of the RBOC came in the summer of 1964 when
a riot focused the attention of the business sector on the ghetto conditions in the inner
city. However, no immediate action was taken and tensions continued unabated until
1966 when Eastman Kodak Co. was forced into a confrontation with a militant group
called FIGHT (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor, Today) over the company's job
training and employment opportunities for minority groups. In the dialogue that de-
veloped, the militant group suggested that Kodak establish a plant in the inner city to be
owned and operated by ghetto residents, patterned after Watts Manufacturing Com-
pany established in Los Angeles by Aerojet-General Company. See note 9 supra. Feel-
ing that a broader base effort was necessary, Kodak formed its own community develop-
ment corporation for the purpose of assisting independent businesses in the inner city
area. Soon thereafter, the RBOC was established by Kodak in a cooperative effort with
the Chamber of Commerce and various Rochester businesses. So far, 60 participating
Rochester businesses have contributed $250,000 to the effort. U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, URBAN AcrioN CLEARINGHOUSE, Case Study No. 6, 1 (1968).
76 Zartman letter, supra note 68.
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and necessary business expenses, apparently by a private ruling.77
An affiliated organization known as the Rochester Opportunities
Foundation, Inc. (ROF) is exempt from taxation under section 501
(c) (3) as a charitable corporation.78  Since the ROF is organized
exclusively for charitable purposes, contributions to it by private in-
dividuals are deductible as charitable contributions under section
170, and the ROF is eligible to receive grants from other large char-
itable foundations.79 On the basis of a recent ruling, 0 the ROF
may distribute its funds to the RBOC even though the latter is not a
charitable organization so long as the ROF retains control over the
funds contributed to insure that they are employed only for objec-
tives consistent with its own exempt charitable purposes.81  By
combining a nonprofit development corporation with a charitable
77U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, URBAN AcTION CLEARINGHOUSE, Case Study
No. 6, 1 (1968).
78Zartman letter, supra note 68.
79 Under Rev. Rule. 67-149, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 133, charitable organizations ex-
empt under Code section 501(c)(3) may make distributions to like organizations.
In recent months, large foundations have begun to contribute substantial amounts
to urban development efforts. On March 26, 1969, Ford Foundation announced
grants totaling $883,325 for bonding programs to enable minority building contrac-
tors to bid on construction jobs in Cleveland, New York, Boston, and Oakland, Calif-
ornia. On the same day, Ford announced grants totaling $221,000 to support the busi-
ness activities of two Philadelphia community groups headed by former gang leaders
and a $100,000 credit guaranty for the use of Ebony Development Corporation of Balti-
more. See Ford Foundation News Release, March 26, 1969, at 1, 6. The grant to Eb-
ony Development Corporation will enable the corporation to borrow funds needed for
purchase by black employees of 10 inner city supermarkets in Baltimore. With the help
of the SBA and a large wholesale grocer, Ebony plans to combine the 10 supermarkets
into a chain operation. Id. at 6.
In addition to the increased grants to development programs, major foundations
have been reevaluating their investment portfolios in anticipation of making direct in-
vestments in ghetto companies. Ten major foundations, including Ford, Carnegie Cor-
poration of New York, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Taconic Foundation, are
considering a joint investment effort. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
80 Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-36 IRB at 15, represents a major step in the development
of an effective tax vehicle for corporate involvement. It holds that a charitable organi-
zation exempt under Code section 501 (c) (3) can make distributions to organizations
which are not themselves exempt under that provision so long as the distributions are
limited to specific projects that are in furtherance of the charitable organization's own
exempt purposes, provided it retains control and discretion as to the use of the funds
distributed and maintains records establishing that the funds are used for section 501
(c) (3) purposes.
81 The crucial issue here is whether the activities of the development corporation -
creating and assisting ghetto businesses - fall within the statutory meaning of "chari-
table." The activities of the RBOC with respect to the assistance rendered to inner city
business are similar to the activities of a Detroit section 502 development corporation
which has been held exempt under section 501(c)(3). See note 89 infra & accompany-
ing text. Thus, there is no question that the activities of the RBOC fall within the defi-
nition of charitable provided in the regulations, and that contributions by the ROF to
the RBOC for investment in inner city businesses are within the scope of ROF's chari-
table exemption.
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foundation, the organizational structure of the Rochester corporate
involvement program provides an effective tax vehicle utilizing both
business and charitable deductions to shelter needed capital into the
ghetto. Working closely with the SBA, the RBOC has made sub-
stantial progress toward vitalizing the inner city economy.S2
(ii) Charitable Investment Corporation.- The racial disturb-
ances that rocked the City of Detroit, Michigan, during the sum-
mer of 196783 prompted an intense reevaluation of the city's de-
velopment program which theretofore had been considered one of
the most progressive and racially attuned in the nation. Business
and civic leaders combined to form the New Detroit Committee
(NDC)84 for the purpose of reassessing past programs and atti-
8 2 The organization of the RBOC is fully explicated in U.S. CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, URBAN ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, Case Study No. 6, 1 (1968); see also Davis,
supra note 50 at 104; McKersie, supra note 35, at 97-99. The efforts of the Rochester
Business community have been praised in Congress. See Address by Rep. Horton, 113
CONG. REC. 34,156 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1967).
Although the RBOC has assisted numerous small businesses in Rochester, the
Fighton Project represents the first cooperative attempt by government and private in-
dustry to initiate a wholly Negro owned and operated large scale business enterprise.
Fighton Manufacturing Corporation has been organized as a joint venture by Xerox
Corporation and the militant Negro organization, FIGHT. The new corporation will
manufacture electrical transformers and metal stampings, employ over 100 people, and
is expected to have gross sales of $1 million annually. Xerox has agreed to provide tech-
nical advice including a full-time manufacturing expert and a financial analyst, and has
also agreed to purchase $500,000 worth of products during each of Fighton's first 2
years. The project is supported by a $445,677 training grant from the Department of
Labor. The RBOC will spend about $200,000 to buy and renovate a plant for lease to
the new corporation and will encourage its other members to buy Fighton products. See
N.Y. Times, June 21, 1968, at 24, col. 5. The Fighton project was announced by Rev.
Franklin D.R. Florence, FIGHT leader, and the New York Times account of the an-
nouncement provides a glimpse into the type of involvement between diverse elements
of society that is possible under such programs: "As Mr. Florence read his statement, a
half dozen Xerox officials and other white businessmen in gray suits stood behind him
in the sparsely furnished office, which is decorated with pictures of Stokely Carmichael,
H. Rap Brown, Muhammed Ali and Che Guevara." Id.
The key to the RBOC's early success in securing the cooperation and participation
of the black community has been the deep personal involvement of top-level commu-
nity leaders in a genuine effort to help the disadvantaged help themselves. Such personal
contact is essential to break the barriers of resentment and mutual distrust between the
"establishment" and the black community so that meaningful progress (social as well as
economic) can be made. By placing more gray suited corporate executives in more
sparsely furnished offices, private industry can make a great contribution toward solving
the urban crisis.
8 3 See generally REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS
47-60 (1968).
84 See id. at 84-85, for an account of the NDC's formation and early difficulties in
securing the fiscal committment of state authorities. Initiated by the joint effort of the
Mayor of Detroit and the Governor of Michigan, the NDC was envisioned as a central
planning body for Detroit's revitalization after the 1967 riots. Although original mem-
bership ranged from key industrialists to leading black militants, the militant element re-
signed over a dispute concerning conditions attached to a $100,000 grant to a black or-
ganization. Id. at 84. Another set-back occurred in the fall of 1967 when the state leg-
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tudes, toward the end of developing an effective new approach to
the problems of race and poverty in -the inner city. The Committee
concluded that direct action in the form of intensified economic de-
velopment was essential, and that to maximize community involve-
ment, development programs should incorporate local planning or-
ganizations operated by inner city residents.
To implement the Committee's mandate for direct action, De-
troit businessmen formed the Economic Development Corporation
of Greater Detroit (EDC) in July, 1968.85 Initial -funding for the
EDC was provided by a $1,450,000 grant from New Detroit, Inc.,
a charitable planning organization formed by major Detroit corpor-
ations. " Organized as a Michigan nonprofit membership corpora-
tion, the broad policy objective of the EDC is to channel the re-
sources of the white business community (capital, business expertise,
and buying power) to black, community-based planning groups
which in turn will invest these resources in the ghetto community to
effect the maximum reduction in unemployment, neighborhood
tensions, and community deterioration. In October, 1968, the EDC
was held exempt from taxation -under section 501 (c) (3) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code as a charitable organization,87 and in January
1969, the scope of 'the EDC's charitable activities was extended to
include the making of loans at below market interest rates and with-
out conventional collateral requirements to independent ghetto
businesses that are "owned or controlled by residents of those areas
who are members of minority or poverty groups. 8
islature refused to pass the NDC's open housing proposal and turned down a request
for increased state aid to Detroit schools. Id.
Confronted with these disaffections, private industry has assumed increasing re-
sponsibility for the overall development effort. In 1968, area businessmen organized
and contributed $12 million to New Detroit, Inc., a nonprofit charitable corporation de-
signed to resume the broad planning activities initiated by the NDC. Operating
through specialized development organizations, New Detroit, Inc. has allocated approx-
imately $6 million to housing construction and rehabilitation and $1,450,000 to aid
ghetto businesses.
85Much of the information concerning the organization and operation of the EDC
is taken from an address by Mr. Michael C. Weston, EDC Secretary and Treasurer, given
before the Institute of Continuing Legal Education conference on Inner City Businesses,
Detroit, Michigan, March 21, 1969.
86 See note 84 supra. New Detroit, Inc. has been held exempt from federal income
taxation as a charitable corporation under Code section 501(c)(3). Corporate contribu-
tions are deductible under Code section 170(b)(1)(2).
87The IRS determination letter was issued to the EDC on Oct. 10, 1968.
88By the terms of the expanded determination of exempt status issued on January
29, 1969, the EDC may make loans, called "soft" loans, to "corporate or other businesses
which are indigenous to the disadvantaged areas of the greater Detroit community in
the sense that they are owned or controlled by residents of those areas who are members
of minority or poverty groups." These loans or loan guarantees are made where funds
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The organizational structure of the EDC evidences the deep in-
volvement of the Detroit business community. The Board of Direc-
tors is composed of 51 of the city's business leaders and the organi-
zation operates through a 17-man executive committee employing a
four-man full-time staff. Within this organizational framework,
requests for assistance are processed so as to effect a maximum de-
gree of interaction between business leaders, ghetto planning groups,
and ultimately individual inner city businessmen. The EDC's most
distinctive operating feature is that potential recipients are located
not by white intrusion into the ghetto, but through various commu-
nity operated planning groups. Requests for assistance from indi-
vidual ghetto businessmen are referred to a black planning group,
such as the Inner City Business Improvement Forum (ICBIF), a
local development corporation chartered under section 502 of the
Small Business Investment Act of 1958.89 The planning group
proceeds to evaluate the prospective recipient to determine the
amount of financial assistance needed and the nature of business
counseling services which will be necessary to insure the success of
the business venture. Financial assistance, which can take the form
of a grant, low interest loan, loan guaranty, or equity investment,
does not come directly from the EDC, but rather from the local
planning group operating as a nonprofit loan or investment com-
pany which is partially funded by the EDC.9 ° Once the planning
group has secured the requisite financing, it requests the EDC to
provide specific technical advice on business matters directly to the
ghetto businessman. The EDC then contacts member firms for per-
sonnel who will provide the requested assistance. Moreover, as part
of the comprehensive effort to finance and counsel independently
owned ghetto businesses, the EDC has requested member corpora-
are not obtainable from conventional financial sources, and are available at below mar-
ket interest rates and without normal security or collateral requirements. The purpose
of such soft loans is to encourage the establishment of viable businesses in the inner
city area, thereby accomplishing the charitable purposes of reducing unemployment,
lessening neighborhood tensions, and preventing community deterioration. See notes
23-28 supra & accompanying text. Although there are no limits on the interest rates
which may be charged on soft loans or on the income levels of the businesses receiving
assistance, the EDC is required by the IRS to keep adequate records to substantiate that
any disbursements made have been to corporations owned or controlled by inner city res-
idents.
89The ICBIF is itself exempt from taxation under Code section 501(c)(3). Tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Lawrence P. Doss, ICBIF President, April 28, 1969.
90 Since a planning group, such as the ICBIF, is chartered as a section 502 local de-
velopment corporation, it is eligible for substantial financial assistance from SBA. See
notes 62-64 supra & accompanying text. The availability of SBA financing for the
planning group allows the EDC to extract maximum leverage from its own funds.
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tions to review their purchasing policies to determine whether
present requirements can be supplied by inner city businesses.
The Detroit corporate involvement program provides a dramatic
illustration of the effectiveness of the charitable corporation as
a vehicle to channel corporate money, expertise, and buying power
into the inner city economy. Operating through various community
sponsored organizations, the charitable investment corporation can,
while securing maximum SBA participation, cause meaningful in-
teraction between the white and black business communities with-
out the undesirable overtones of white paternalism.
In Cleveland, local corporations have pledged a total of $11
million to Cleveland: Now!, a comprehensive inner city develop-
ment effort initiated by Cleveland Mayor Carl B. Stokes." A total
of $500,000 of Cleveland: Now! funds has been allocated to the
Greater Cleveland Growth Corporation for the development of in-
ner city businesses. The Growth Corporation works closely with
SBA, and especially with SBA Project Own, in making loans to
ghetto entrepreneurs. As of February, 1969, Cleveland: Now!
had actually collected $4,042,304, only $57,450 of which has been
spent on small business opportunities. 2 Of the $4 million plus of
Cleveland: Now! funds already collected, $300,000 represents the
value of professional services and assistance given by business and
industry. 3  Although the Cleveland organization to aid independ-
ent ghetto businesses has some structural weaknesses which may in
91 Cleveland: Now! is exempt from federal taxation under section 501(c)(3), and
contributions are deductible under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.
9 2 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 26, 1969, at 1, coL 3.
93 Id. An interesting tax question concerns the deductibility of the $300,000 in
professional services provided Cleveland: Now! by local business and industry. Under
the regulations, no charitable deduction may be taken for the value of services donated
to a charitable organization. See Treas. Regs. § 1.170-2 (a) (2) (1968). The statutory
basis for the treasury's position is that Code section 170(a)(1) requires an actual "pay-
ment" to a charity, and the IRS takes the position that services do not constitute a "pay-
ment." See B. BITrKER, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 174 (1964).
Logically, the next question is whether the corporations donating the services of their
top executives to a charity can continue to deduct, as compensation expenses under Code
section 162(a), all salaries paid to employees who spend company time working on chari-
table development projects. Although there appears to be no authority on this question,
there would seem to be no reason for denying the compensation deduction. To the ex-
tent that the employer retains control over the employee's activities, the services rend-
ered to the charity are performed "for the employer." In its business discretion, the em-
ployer may decide that the corporation will gain a substantial public relations benefit
from involving its employees in charitable activity. Where the charitable activity is
community development that will ultimately improve the inner city business climate,
the corporation will receive a direct benefit from the charitable activities of its employ-
ees. The cumulative effect of these corporate benefits flowing from the charitable activ-
ities of its employees should be sufficient to justify the compensation expense deduction.
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part account for the -fact that only a fraction of its resources have
been put to use, 94 the program serves as another illustration of how a
charitable entity can be established to involve the resources of pri-
vate corporations in a concerted effort to rejuvenate the inner city
economy.
(iii) Small Business Investment Company.- There is yet an-
other vehicle which could be formed for the purpose of channeling
private corporate capital into ghetto businesses: a Small Busi-
ness Investment Company (SBIC) under the Small Business Invest-
ment Act of 195s." An SBIC is a private corporation chartered un-
der state law and licensed by the SBA for the express purpose of
supplying venture capital and long term financing to small business
concerns.96 Initial minimum private investment required for for-
mation of an SBIC can be as little as $150,000, and the SBIC would
be eligible for loans from the SBA aggregating $300,000. 97  Na-
94 The pledge of $11 million, as well as the services of key personnel donated to
Cleveland: Now! by area corporations evidences local industry's concern for the inner
city. Unfortunately, however, the Cleveland Growth Corporation which actually dis-
perses funds to ghetto businesses lacks the comprehensive structure of the Detroit de-
velopment effort whereby private industry has been involved in the process by which
money is allocated to community sponsored planning groups acting as a liaison between
the white corporate establishment and the black ghetto community. Without the black
planning group to act as an intermediary, greater difficulties will occur in the sensitive
areas of screening potential recipients and policing loans once they are made. These
added problems may cause the dispensing organization to be overly conservative in its
screening process.
Unlike the Detroit Economic Development Corporation the Cleveland Growth Cor-
poration has not brought major Cleveland corporations together in a common develop-
ment effort to aid inner city businesses, and thus has not fully utilized private industry
as a source of managerial expertise and economic buying power. Another drawback is
the fact that the growth corporation has confined itself to loaning money, and has not
become a source of much-needed equity capital. In this respect it should be noted that
profits earned by a charitable corporation on equity investments in ghetto corporations
would not jeopardize the organization's exempt status where such profits are reinvested
in furtherance of its exempt purposes. See notes 26-27 supra & accompanying text.
The charitable corporation could also sell the shares which it acquires to local residents
since such activity would further the charitable purposes of reducing neighborhood ten-
sions and preventing community deterioration by promoting local ownership and con-
trol of the community's productive resources. See notes 25-26 supra & accompanying
text. For a discussion of the relative superiority of risk capital investments in ghetto
businesses, see text accompanying note 106 infra.
95 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 681-87 (1964). Relevant SBA regulations are contained in 13
C.F.R. §§ 107.1-.1411 (1969).
96 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 681, 685 (1964). A "small business concern" is generally de-
fined as a business "which is independently owned and operated and which is not domi-
nant in its field of operation." Id. § 632; 13 C.F.R. § 121.3 (a) (1969).
97 Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 683 (1964), an SBIC is required to have a total initial paid-
in capital and surplus of $300,000. However, section 682 authorizes the SBA to pur-
chase the SBIC's subordinated debentures in an amount equal to the paid-in capital and
surplus from private sources; and this amount is included in the SBIC's total paid-in
capital and surplus. Thus, with $150,000 in capital from private sources and
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tional banks, federal reserve member banks, and state banks insured
by the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation are authorized
to purchase SBIC shares in an amount equal to 5 percent of the
bank's capital and surplus. 8 The SBIC itself is authorized not only
to make long term loans to selected small business concerns in the
ghetto area,90 but also to purchase stock'00 or debt securities'' is-
sued by those concerns. In addition to supplying capital to inner
city businesses, the SBIC could provide essential consulting and ad-
visory services.
As part of a comprehensive plan to facilitate the flow of capital
to small businesses, Congress has provided several income tax incen-
tives for investing in SBIC's. For example, dividends paid to an
SBIC by small businesses are subject to 100 percent dividends re-
ceived deduction.0 3 In order to partially compensate for the
greater risk that may be involved with investments in an SBIC,
Congress has also provided that any loss on -the sale of SBIC stock
shall be treated as -an ordinary loss, fully deductible from taxable in-
come, while any gain on the sale of SBIC stock is treated as capital
gain, taxable at a maximum rate of 25 percent. 0 The SBIC itself
gets similar tax treatment with respect to any losses sustained on
convertible debentures issued by small business concerns. 0 5
The SBIC can play a vital role in development of the inner city
$150,000 in SBA subordinated debentures, the SBIC would have the statutory
$300,000 total paid-in capital and surplus. Once formed, the SBIC may borrow money
from the SBA for operating purposes in an amount equal to 50 percent of its total paid-
in capital and surplus. 15 U.S.C.A. § 683(b) (1964).
With $150,000 in private capital and $150,000 in SBA subordinated debentures,
the SBIC may borrow another $150,000 for operating purposes. With greater amounts
of private capital contribution, an SBIC can receive more SBA funds up to a maximum
of $7,500,000. Id.
98 15 U.S.C.A. § 682(b) (Supp. 1969).
09 13 C.F.R. § 107.301 (1969). An SBIC may not make loans for a period of less
than 5 years' duration, id. § 107.301 (a), or for a period longer than 20 years, except
that loans may be renewed for an additional 10 years. Id. § 107.602(d). An SBIC may
make short term loans of less than 5 years' duration only where necessary to protect
previous investments. Id. § 107.301(d).
100 Id. § 107.301(b) (1). Without SBA approval, an SBIC may not obtain voting
control of the small businesses in which it invests. Id. § 107.901 (b), except where nec-
essary to protect its investments. Id.
101 Id. § 107.302, which defines equity security to include convertible debt securities.
The SBIC is intended to function as a source of equity venture capital, and not as
a banking institution. Thus, the relevant SBA regulations foster equity investments.
102 Id. § 107.601. An SBIC is authorized to form a subsidiary corporation for man-
agement consulting services. Id. § 107.602.
103 CODE § 24 3(a) (2).
104 CODE §§ 1242, 172; Treas. Regs. § 1.1242-1 (1968).
105 CODE § 1243.
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economy. With emphasis on equity participation, the success of the
SBIC as a profit-making venture is intimately tied to the success of
the ghetto corporations in which it invests, giving the SBIC a vested
interest in the profits and growth of the inner city companies.
Since the SBIC is oriented toward profits and growth rather than
security of principal, -it should enjoy a more amicable relationship
with the ghetto companies than would exist in the normal debtor-
creditor situation. This mutuality of interest between the SBIC
and the ghetto companies would facilitate a freer flow of ideas on
a business-like basis without the stigma of the handout. Without
the constant burden of interest payments, the ghetto companies
would have more freedom of action in the crucial early years of op-
eration. Finally, an SBIC can also function as that much needed
vehicle through which to promote stock ownership among inner
city residents. Two recently-formed SBIC's, Accord in Detroit and
Business's Development Corporation in Philadelphia, have sold
stock to inner city residents at low prices and are reinvesting the pro-
ceeds in newly created ghetto companies." 6
There are numerous organizational vehicles available for private
corporations to engage in assistance to ghetto businesses. The most
attractive approach would be a cooperative effort between several
corporations utilizing one of the above-mentioned programs.
Through either the establishment of an SBIC, a charitable invest-
ment corporation, a section 502 development company, or a combi-
nation of these devices, corporate capital can be effectively chan-
neled into the inner city for the promotion and development of
independently owned and operated ghetto businesses.
D. Proposed Federal Legislation Offering Special Tax
Incentives for Private Investment in Ghetto Businesses
The Community Self Determination Act of 1968
Under all of the corporate involvement programs proposed thus
far, the only tax advantage available to companies participating in
programs designed to aid inner city businesses is in the form of a tax
deduction for amounts contributed.10 7 As previously noted, how-
ever, the availability of a tax deduction for corporate expenditures
on ghetto projects, although helpful, is probably not sufficiently at-
106 See McKersie, supra note 35, at 95.
107 The deduction may take the form of a business expense deduction, or a chari-
table deduction, depending upon the nature of the donee organization. See notes 66-73,
87-88 supra & accompanying text.
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tractive to induce the large-scale commitment necessary to make real
progress toward solutions to the urban crisis.' 08 Since a corpora-
tion's income is presently taxed at a maximum rate of about 52 per-
cent, the deduction means that 'the government supplies only 52
cents of each corporate dollar spent in the ghetto - the other 48
cents comes out of corporate earnings that would otherwise be avail-
able for distribution to shareholders or for other internal corporate
purposes. Although the 48 cents coming out of the corporate treas-
ury will eventually return to the corporation and its shareholders in
the form of a social dividend, cash flow is reduced by 48 percent of
the expenditure with no expectation of an immediate monetary re-
turn.
In view of the relatively limited attractiveness of the tax deduc-
tion from a financial point of view, proponents of corporate
involvement have called for the institution of tax credits and other
more direct tax incentives that will enable corporate investments in
ghetto businesses to generate an immediate financial return. It 'is
generally assumed that 'the prospect of an immediate dollar return
which is competitive with alternative investment opportunities will
provide a more powerful inducement to profit oriented private in-
dustry than appeals to the corporate conscience.10 9 Although the
idea of involving private corporations in -the 'high risk, high cost
area of ghetto enterprise through a system of indirect government
subsidies is not without its skeptics," 0 the movement has continued
168 See note 34 supra & accompanying text for a discussion of the potential value of
the charitable deduction incident to the contribution of low basis property to a ghetto
project.
109 During the presidential campaign of 1968, both candidates endorsed using the
tax law to encourage businesses to locate plants in poverty areas. As a candidate, Presi-
dent Nixon stated that "t]ax incentives - whether direct credits, accelerated depreda-
tion or a combination of the two - should be provided to those businesses that locate
branch offices or new plants in poverty areas .... " He also approved "tax incentives
to corporations which hire and train the unskilled and upgrade the skills of those at the
bottom of the employment ladder." RESEARCH INST. OF AM., TAX COORDINATOR
BI-WEEKLY ALERT at 1 (Sept. 26, 1968). See also REP. OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC
COMm. EMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN THE CITIES: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE REP. ON THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, S. Rep. No.
1568 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1968), where the role of tax incentives is discussed.
110 Michael Harrington has warned that the "economics of free enterprise make it
unlikely that the entrepreneurs - even with tax incentives and subsidies - are really
going to involve themselves in the high risk problems of the poor." Harrington, The
Urgent Case for Social Investment, Saturday Rev. Nov. 23, 1968, at 32. See also Har-
rington, The Social Industrial Complex, Harper's Magazine, Nov. 1967, at 55. Former
Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley S. Surrey has repeatedly argued against special
tax credits and incentives for non-revenue purposes, reasoning that their cost, in terms
of foregone federal revenues, greatly exceeds the cost of direct federal expenditures. Ad-
dress by Secretary Surrey, Fifth Annual Development Forum Urban America, Inc.,
19691
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 825
to gain momentum."'
Inspired by Xerox Corporation's Fighton project in Rochester,
Oct 28, 1968. See Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1968, at 7, col. 3. Senator Long, chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee has also spoken against the use of tax incentives to involve
the business community in urban redevelopment. See RESEARCH INST. OF AM., TAX
COORDINATOR BI-WEEKLY ALERT, supra note 109. Indeed, some businessmen have
recently exhibited a certain ambivalence toward the desirability of tax incentives.
See Demaree, What Business Wants from President Nixon, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 84.
111 Once the policy decision has been made to involve private industry in the war on
poverty, the crucial issue becomes whether the inducement for action will take the form
of direct government subsidies, or indirect subsidies through tax incentives. In princi-
ple, the Treasury Department has consistently opposed the tax inducements. The
Treasury's basic arguments are: (1) the cumulative effect of a system of special credits
and deductions to achieve specific social goals would lead to an erosion of the tax base
because when such programs exist the rate of taxation becomes dependent upon the
source of income, and corporations with equal incomes will be taxed at unequal rates;
(2) the effectiveness of a tax incentive program in achieving the desired social goal is
difficult to evaluate since there is no effective way to measure the cost of such programs
in terms of foregone tax revenues; (3) tax incentive programs are impossible to control
since the tax benefits remain in effect long after the social objective has been accom-
plished. See Note, Government Programs to Encourage Private Investment in Low-
Income Housing, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1295, 1310 (1968). The Treasury Department's
specific objections to tax incentives are contained in Hearings on S. 2100 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 148, cited in Note, supra. However
logical the treasury's arguments, they ignore the fact that the present tax structure is full
of special social goals. As pointed out by the late Senator Robert Kennedy:
The concept of government incentives to induce desired investments by pri-
vate industy is neither new nor radical.
We have used the tax laws as a means of persuading private citizens and en-
terprises to invest in desired ways at desired times, and in desired locations.
To encourage long-term investment, we tax capital gains at a ceiling of twenty-
five percent. To encourage charitable contributions, we allow them to be
deducted from current income. To encourage oil and mineral production, we
offer depletion allowances. To encourage the building of grain storage fa-
cilities and defense plants, we have offered faster-than-normal depreciation
rates. To encourage investment in capital goods, as opposed to inventory or
consumption, we have allowed tax credits for such investment; suspended that
credit when we wished to slow investment down; and reinstated it in order to
speed investment up again. R. KENNEDY, To SEEK A NEWER WORLD 42-43
(1967).
It is evident that the tax law is, and has always been, a positive instrument of social
policy and not merely a revenue device. See Symposium, Federal Taxation as an
Instrument of Social and Economic Policy, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 431 (1968). The con-
cept of using tax incentives in the form of tax credits and rapid depreciation allowances
to induce companies to establish plants in ghetto areas resembles most closely the use o:
similar tax devices to encourage investment in underdeveloped countries. See Hella-
well, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1393 (1966). The economic development of Puerto Rico
through "Operation Bootstrap," has been facilitated by a system of tax exemptions
"carefully protected by our own Internal Revenue Code.' R. KENNEDY, supra. Surely,
if tax incentives are appropriate to encourage the economic development of foreign
countries, they are just as appropriate to encourage investment in underdeveloped urban
areas within this country.
Notwithstanding the treasury's opposition, the 90th Congress did pass Title IX of
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, P. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968),
creating a tax oriented mechanism designed to increase the return to private capital in-
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New York,n1 2 by successful self-help programs in Crawfordville,
Georgia and the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of New York City," 3
and by the growing disinchantment with conventional poverty pro-
grams, legislation was introduced in Congress in July of 1968 con-
taining sweeping tax incentives for private industry to invest in ghetto
businesses as part of a radically new approach to solving the crisis in
the cities as well as the poverty problems in rural areas. The new
bill, known as the Community Self-Determination Act of 1968,"1
would create a comprehensive program designed to involve private
industry in a partnership with government for the purpose of help-
ing the poor "achieve gainful employment and the ownership and
control of the resources of their community, including businesses,
housing, and financial institutions.""' 5 The proposed incentives for
corporate involvement are embodied in six major amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code which, through a system of tax credits and
exemptions, rapid amortization, and nonrecognition provisions, would
overcome the 'high costs of operating a plant in a poverty area and
vested in low income housing. See Gabinet & Coffey, Housing Partnerships: Shelters
from Taxes and Shelters for People, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 723 (1969) (this issue).
Bipartisan legislation now in Congress would amend the Internal Revenue Code in six
major respects offering a broad spectrum of tax benefits to industrial corporations which
become involved with the creation and operation of new businesses in ghetto areas.
See notes 119-127 infra & accompanying text.
12 See note 82 supra.
113 Crawford Enterprises is a community-owned, cooperatively operated factory in
Crawfordville, Georgia. Formed by a rural economist with the aid of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, the factory has been sufficiently profitable to en-
able it to take steps toward the acquisition of local housing facilities and commercial
establishments. See A. TOBIER, COOPERATIVE COMMUNITIES NoRTH AND SoUTH:
A RESPONSE TO POVERTY, reprinted in 114 CONG. REc 9271 (daily ed. July 24,
1968) (introduction to S. 3876, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 1968). A somewhat less success-
ful effort toward community ownership was begun by the late Senator Kennedy in the
Bedford-Stuyvesant section of New York. Id.
114 S. 3876, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as S. 3876]. S. 3876 is
the Republican version of the bill introduced by Senator Percy on July 24, 1968. An
identical bill, S. 3875, backed by the Democratic Party was introduced by Senator Nel-
son on the same day. See also H.R. 18715, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill is
presently undergoing refinement by its major co-sponsors pending reintroduction in the
91st. Congress. Letter from Senator Percy to CASE W. RES. L. REv., April 17, 1969.
11 S.3876, at § 2(c). Concluding that "Ehlandouts are demeaning," and that past
programs and policies which "tax some to support others offer no hope and no oppor-
tunity to those who have the capacity to become productive, contributing citizens," the
bill finds that:
[I]he private enterprise system and the independent sector should be offered
new incentives to join with the people of a community in a partnership for
individual and community improvement, especially in providing technical
and managerial expertise, offering training for job with a future, providing
investment capital, and building productive plants and facilities for sale to
members of the community. Id. §§ 2(b), (e).
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provide a positive dollar return to the participating corporation.
Ultimately, the facilities established by private corporations would
be sold to community-owned and operated development corpora-
tions which would use the profits from these operations to provide
essential social services to the community, thereby "reducing the
burden of taxation on the rest of society. 11 6  In order to fully
understand the operation of the various tax devices, a brief descrip-
tion of -the bill's major nontax features -is necessary.
The first step in implementing the proposed program would be
formation of a National Community Development Corporation
Certification Board, an independent federal agency, which would
oversee 'the formation of local Community Development Corpora-
tions (CDC's) in various poverty areas both in the inner city and in
depressed rural areas. To obtain its charter, a CDC would have to
organize in the community by securing the approval of at least 10
percent of the residents who agree to buy at least one share of $5
par value stock in the CDC. A minimum of 500 community resi-
dents 16 years of age or older would be required to pledge a total
of at least $5,000 before the CDC can receive a provisional charter
from Washington. The permissible size of the community could
vary from 3000 to 300,000 residents. To be eligible to form a CDC,
the community must have a "development index" of less than 90,
which in general means that the community must have a level of af-
fluence, measured in terms of area unemployment or median fam-
ily income, no greater than nine-tenths the national level."' Ulti-
mately, a majority of the community residents would have to
approve formation of the CDC before the corporation could receive
a permanent charter. Once chartered, the CDC would then be eli-
gible to receive loans and other assistance from a local community
development bank which in turn would be eligible for assistance
from a National Development Bank funded by the issuance of
debentures guaranteed by the federal government. Residents of the
community would elect a board of directors and the directors ap-
point a Business Management Board which would have primary
operational control over the CDC's investment and community ser-
vice activities. Thus, the CDC becomes the instrument through
lId. § 2 (e).
117 1d. § 138. The development index is a key feature of the bill. The tax incen-
tives to private corporations are geared to the index - as the index rises with the in-
crease in community affluence, the tax benefits become less attractive. See note 120
infra & accompanying text.
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which local residents will ultimately acquire ownership and control
of the resources of the community.118
Private industry enters the picture by entering into "turnkey"
contracts with a CDC whereby a private corporation would agree to
construct a productive facility in the poverty area, operate it for sev-
eral years, and then sell it to the CDC when the facility becomes
economically self-sustaining. During the period in which the turn-
key facility is operated by a private corporation, the corporation
would receive substantial tax benefits.
(1) Amortization.- Assume that X Corporation enters into
a turnkey contract with a local CDC to construct a manufacturing
plant in the ghetto, operate it -for 5 years or until the plant shows a
net after-tax profit of Y dollars for 2 consecutive years, whichever
occurs first. Assume further that X Corporation constructs a new
facility at a total cost of $1 million. Under section 304 of the new
bill, X Corporation could elect to amortize its entire investment in
the facility, including the cost of land, over a relatively short pe-
riod.11 The time period over which X Corporation may amortize
its turnkey investment is determined by the development index of
the local community. 120 In a community with a development index
1 1 8 The rather elaborate procedure for the formation and operation of a CDC is set
out more fully in the introductory remarks by Senators Nelson and Percy, 114 CONG.
REC. 9270 (daily ed. July 24, 1968) introduction to S.3876, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
See also Note, Community Development Corporation: a New Approach to the Pov-
erty Problem, 82 HARv. L. REv. 644 (1969). The bill has been severely criticized on.
the ground that CDC's would perpetuate the economic isolation of the ghetto. See
Sturdivant, The Limits of Black Capitalism, HARv. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 122.
Andrew J. Biemiller, AFL-CIO legislative director and a former Congressman, has also
spoken out against the bill. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1968, at 20, col. 1.
119 S. 3876 § 304. The amortization deduction is in lieu of the normal depreciation
deduction allowable under present Code section 167. However, a taxpayer having elected
amortization could at anytime thereafter elect to discontinue amortization and pick up
regular section 167 depreciation, but cannot use any method of accelerated depreciation.
Id. at § 304(c).
120 S. 3876, at § 304. As defined in section 138, the development index is equal to
the ratio of the national percentage rate of unemployment to the rate of unemploy-
ment in the poverty area or the ratio of the median family income in the poverty area to
the national family median income, whichever ratio, expressed as a whole number, is
lower. As the development index rises from less than 80 toward the national norm of
100, the period over which X Corporation could amortize its investment increases from
36 to 60 months. The higher the level of community affluence, the longer it would
take to recover the investment. Once the development index attains 100, or the nat-
ional average, amortization would no longer be allowed, and a major incentive for
investing in turnkey facilities would disappear. Thus, by gearing rapid recovery of total
investment to the level of community affluence, the bill incorporates a mechanism
whereby the tax benefits to private industry are automatically phased out as the need
for corporate involvement disappears. This feature of the bill should dispel the fears
of opponents who argue that tax benefits, once adopted, will remain available long after
the social objective has been accomplished. See note 110 supra. The bill has other
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of less than 80, X Corporation could recover its entire investment
in 3 years.
(2) Human Investment Credit.- Section 306 of the bill
amends the Internal Revenue Code by adding section 41 providing
for a tax credit equal to 10 percent of the wages and salaries paid to
employees of the turnkey facility who are drawn from the poverty
area and who are also CDC shareholders. The 10 percent human
investment credit is in addition to the 7 percent credit presently
available on investments in machinery.1
21
When X Corporation sells the turnkey facility to the CDC, it
would receive the following tax benefits:
(1) No Recapture of Investment Credits.- Normally when a
taxpayer sells property on which it has taken an investment credit,
there will be some recapture of the previous credit. 1 2  Under sec-
tion 305 of the new bill, however, there would be no recapture of
the credit upon a sale -to a CDC.
built-in safeguards and self-effectuating controls which tend to eliminate the arguments
against tax incentives raised by the Treasury. See Id. Section 306 would give the Secre-
tary of the Treasury review power over every turnkey contract, and no such contract can
become effective for tax purposes without his approval. Section 311 gives the IRS the
power to require information returns from turnkey contractors. Such information will
enable the Treasury to assess the cost of turnkey contracts in terms of foregone tax
revenues, thereby providing a basis upon which to evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
gram.
121 S. 3876, at § 306. The 10 percent human investment credit is analogous to
the 7 percent tax credit for investment in machinery presently allowed under section 38
of the Internal Revenue Code. The higher rate of the credit for human investment is
"due to the impermanence of the investment in human skills." 114 CONG. REC. 9283
(daily ed. July 24, 1968) (remarks by Senator Percy). The amount of the human in-
vestment credit cannot exceed "(A) so much of the liability for tax for the taxable
year as does not exceed $25,000, plus (B) 50 percent of so much of the liability for tax
for the taxable year as exceeds $25,000." Id. Thus, X Corporation would have to pay
tax on at least $25,000 of income before it could receive a credit for wages paid, and the
credit could not exceed half of the tax on X's income over $25,000. There would be,
however, a 3-year carryback and a 7-year carryover for unused human investment cred-
its. Id.
The idea of an income tax credit based on wages paid to employees drawn from pov-
erty areas originated with the Urban Employment Opportunities Development Act of
1967, S. 2088, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by the late Senator Kennedy on
July 12, 1967. The Kennedy bill provided for a tax credit equal to 25 percent of the
wages paid to low income individuals. Other tax incentives contained in the bill in-
cluded: (1) a 10 percent investment credit on machinery instead of the usual 7 percent,
(2) a 7 percent credit on costs of construction or leasing of facilities; (3) a 3-year
carryback and 10-year carryover of unused credits; (4) a useful life, for purposes of de-
preciation, equal to two-thirds of the normal useful life applicable to real and per-
sonal property; and (5) a net operating loss carryover of 10 years. See R. KENNEDY,
supra note 111, at 44. The impact of the Kennedy bill is analyzed in Garrity, Red Ink
for Ghetto Industries?, HARV. Bus. REV. May-June, 1968, at 16.
122See CODE § 47(a). Under S. 3876, there would be no recapture of investment
credit provided the CDC did not dispose of the facility within 1 year after the sale.
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(2) Nonrecognition of Gain.- Section 307 provides that up-
on the sale of a turnkey facility to a CDC, gain shall be recognized
only to the extent that the gain exceeds the taxpayer's holdings of
Class B stock issued by a Community Development Bank (CDB).123
Thus, by reinvesting the proceeds from the sale of a turnkey facility
in a new facility or in CDB stock, X Corporation could postpone
recognition of its capital gains.
(3) No Recapture of Amortization.- If X Corporation were
to sell the turnkey facility to someone other than a CDC, it could ex-
pect to experience recapture of the tax benefits derived from rapid
amortization of depreciable property.124 Under section 308 of the
new bill, however, there would be no recapture of prior amortiza-
tion if X reinvested the proceeds from the sale in another turnkey
facility or in CDB stock. 2 5
(4) Sustained Profitability Credit.- The tax benefits from
investing in a turnkey project would not end upon the sale of the
facility to a CDC. Section 309 provides that X Corporation
would continue to receive a tax credit equal to 15 percent of the
profits generated by the turnkey facility for 5 years after sale to a
CDC."2 6 By gearing this substantial tax benefit to the profitability
of the turnkey facility, the bill creates a powerful inducement for X
Corporation to employ its business expertise to make the turnkey
project efficient and profitable when it is -turned over to the CDC.
By extending the credit over a period of 5 years, the bill encourages
X Corporation to retain close ties with the turnkey operation after
123 Unrecognized gain is applied against the basis of the new facility or holdings of
CDB stock. S. 3876, at § 307. Cf. CODE § 1034, providing for nonrecognition of
gain upon, the sale of a residence where a new residence is acquired within 1 year. By
reducing the basis of the new facility in an amount equal to the unrecognized gain
from previous sales of turnkey facilities, the taxpayer would have a significantly lower
amortizable basis in the new facility. Assuming that the investment in the old facility
had been completely written off through amortization deductions at the time of sale, the
entire amount realized upon the sale of the facility would be gain. Reinvestment in a
new facility of comparable size would give the tax payer a zero basis in the new facility
and thus preclude amortization deductions on the new facility. Thus, it is evident that
the tax benefits available under S. 3876 decrease significantly on subsequent investments
where no capital gains tax has been paid on previous dispositions.
1 24 See CODE §§ 1245 & 1250.
125 S. 3876 § 308. If X Corp. should elect to recognize gain as provided under sec-
tion 308, there would be recapture of amortization only to the extent of the gain recog-
nized. Id.
126 Id. § 309. The amount of the credit could not exceed X Corporation's tax liabil-
ity computed without regard to any foreign tax credits, partially exempt interest, or in-
vestment credits. There is a 3-year carryback and a 5-year carryover of unused sustained
profitability credits. Id.
1969]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 825
its sale, providing assistance and supply contracts to insure the fa-
cility's continued profitability. 2 7
The Community Self Determination Bill presents a marked de-
parture from previous poverty programs. Unlike present programs
of the welfare -type which often have a tendency to perpetuate the
economic dependency of the disadvantaged, the Self-Determination
Bill would provide the poor with the essential tools to shape a pros-
perous existence for themselves. The key to the bill's success is
economic development, and the key to such development is the
broad participation of private industry. Through a system of
powerful tax incentives, the bill would bypass the federal govern-
ment as the middleman in the effort to eradicate poverty128 and in-
volve private corporations directly with local communities in a
broad based self-betterment program. The availability of a positive
dollar return on ghetto projects made possible by tax inducements
would involve increased numbers of large corporations 12 9 in the ef-
fort to find a solution to the country's greatest domestic problem.
127 Without the inducement of the sustained profitability credit, the investing cor-
poration might be tempted to take advantage of early tax benefits in the form of rapid
amortization and credits for wages paid, without making a concerted effort to develop a
truly profitable operation. It has been suggested that the sustained profitability credit
would not itself be sufficient to insure that the investing corporation would not milk the
turnkey facility for early tax benefits without concern for its future profitability; and
that the CDC should insist that the turnkey contract sales price be based on a multiple of
earnings formula to provide an added incentive for the turnkey contractor to create a
profitable operation. See Note, supra note 118 at 663.
128 Rather than siphoning tax dollars from local industry to Washington and then
channeling those same dollars back into the urban ghettos and rural poverty areas under
federally implemented poverty programs, the tax incentive approach would leave a cer-
tain amount of potential tax revenues in local industry and direct those funds toward
socially desirable ends through a system of appropriate controls. The significant by-prod-
ucts of such a direct approach would be elimination of some bureaucratic inefficiencies,
and more importantly, the opportunity for the poor to better themselves in produc-
tive employment. As to whether the tax incentive approach to involving private indus-
try is superior to direct government subsidies, see note 111 supra & accompanying text.
Although there is some evidence that businessmen favor the tax credit approach over
direct subsidies (see JOINT ECONOMIC CoMM. REP. supra note 109 at 9) many of the
corporate executives surveyed in the Cleveland area indicated that they feared the red
tape which would accompany any program of subsidization by the federal government,
and some disfavored government assistance in any form other than tax deductibility for
expenditures made on private development efforts. In this respect it should be noted
that the comprehensive tax incentive provisions of the Community Self-Determination
Bill would be virtually self-effectuating thereby, eliminating much governmental red
tape. See note 120 supra & accompanying text.
12 9 The tax incentive provisions of S. 3876 are directed toward large industrial cor-
porations; most small companies would not have the capital or manpower necessary to
find a turnkey project. However, small companies would continue to benefit from fed-
eral grants under the various manpower programs and could participate in the coopera-
tive development programs outlined in notes 57-106 supra & accompanying text.
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III. THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE AUTHORITY TO
ENGAGE IN GHETTO DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
It is evident from the preceeding materials that there are many
viable programs which private corporations might initiate to en-
hance the development of the inner city economy. One basic ques-
tion remains - whether the application of corporate assets and ex-
pertise to aid ghetto businesses is beyond the scope of corporate
authority.3 0
A private corporation has only such powers as are expressly or
impliedly granted in its charter or are derived from powers ex-
pressly granted to all corporations by statute.'3 ' Where the power
to divert corporate assets for the benefit of the public welfare is
not expressly reserved in the corporate charter or conferred by stat-
ute, the requisite authority must be inferred from the general pur-
poses for which the corporation was created. Since the common law
viewed the corporation as existing exclusively to generate profits
for its shareholders, the early cases held that a corporation had no
implied power to make contributions to the general public wel-
fare,132 and that contributions for specific projects could be justified
only where there was a demonstrable "corporate benefit" flowing
to the corporation as a result of the expenditure.3 Although a
strong argument can be made that expenditures on ghetto develop-
ment projects result in a significant corporate benefit sufficient to
sustain funds expended under the common law rule, 34 this will be
unnecessary in the majority of states which have enacted broad stat-
utes expressly empowering corporations to divert funds to charity
130 Several of the corporations surveyed in the Cleveland area expressed some con-
cern that extensive urban development programs might be ultra vires, giving rise to
shareholder suits and the potential for personal liability of the directors for misuse of
corporate assets.
11 See generally 18 C.J.S. Corporations §§ 23-34 (1939); H. HENN, CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 183-86 (1961); Annot., Power of a Business Corporation to Donate to a Char-
itable or Similar Institution, 39 A.L.R.2d 1192 (1955).
-
3 2 The leading early case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W.
668 (1919), holding that a corporation could not accumulate earnings from a general
public purpose without paying any dividends to its shareholders. The court did not,
however, rule out the possibility that some earnings could be applied to a public pur-
pose.
'33 See, e.g., Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exchange Bank, 16 Ga. App. 425, 85 S.E. 634
(1915); Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co. 140 IIl. 248,
29 N.E. 1044 (1892); Note, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 122 (1953); Annot., supra note 131 at
1194 n.2.
13 4 The arguments respecting the private corporation's vested business interest in the
general prosperity and civil tranquility of the local community are set out in note 148
infra & accompanying text.
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and for the general social and economic betterment of the commu-
nity.' 3' Once a proposed ghetto development project has been
brought within the authority derived from the statute, the directors
are limited only by that standard of reasonableness and prudence
which attaches to the exercise of all corporate powers.'3 6
Characteristic of the breadth of the statutes empowering private
corporations to act for -the public welfare is the New York statute
authorizing corporations "[to make donations, irrespective of cor-
porate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund, hos-
pital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes
.... ,,137 In Ohio, corporations are empowered "to make donations
for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes."' 38 The leading case in this area is A. P. Smith Alanufac-
turing Co. v. Barlow,'319 where the New Jersey Supreme Court up-
held against shareholder objection the corporation's gift of $1500
to Princeton University. The Court held that not only was the do-
nation lawful under the statute authorizing charitable gifts, but it
was also within the corporation's implied and incidental powers un-
der common law principles since a contribution to a local university
would benefit the corporation by strengthening the community. 140
'
3 5 See discussion of specific statutory provisions in notes 137-39 infra.
136 Even in states which have not enacted statutes eliminating the requirement of a
corporate benefit to justify expenditures for the public welfare, the modern definition of
"corporate benefit" has been expanded to include the benefits, in public relations value,
which flow from corporate involvement in social programs. Thus, in Union Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958), the Utah Supreme
Court refused to give retroactive application to a recently enacted statute authorizing
gifts to charity and the public welfare, but nonetheless sustained a contribution to a non-
profit organization on the ground that corporate power for such activity was implicit in
the corporation's charter:
The new concept of corporate responsibility seems to have become fait accom-
pi.
We believe that if it [the contribution] were made with the studied and not
unreasonable conviction that it would benefit the corporation, it should be
the type of thing that should rest in the sound discretion of management and
within the ambit of a legitimate exercise of implied authority in the ordi-
nary course of the company's business. 8 Utah 2d at 107-09, 329 P.2d at
401-02.
137 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(12) (McKinney 1962).
138 OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.13 (Page 1964). Other state statutes are similarly
worded. See e.g., CAL CORP. CODE § 802 (g) (West 1955) ("to make donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes"); ILL. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 157.5(m) (Smith-Hurd 1964) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.10(K)
(West 1967) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1302(16) (1967) (same). National
Banks are also authorized to make contributions for the public welfare. 12 U.S.C. § 24
(1964).
'-9 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
140 Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586.
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Finding that under modern economic conditions much of the Na-
tion's wealth has become concentrated under corporate control, the
court declared that these conditions "require that corporations ac-
knowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as
members of the communities within which they operate" and that:
[Ilndividual stockholders, whose private interests rest entirely up-
on the well-being of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be per-
mitted to dose their eyes to present-day realities and thwart the
long-visioned corporate action in recognizing and voluntarily dis-
charging its high obligations as a constituent of our modern social
structure.' 41
Although it might be argued that the contribution of a modest
sum to a university or other established charitable institution is dis-
tinguishable from the application of sizable amounts of corporate
assets to form a ghetto business, it is clear that the present-day real-
ities in the Nation's cities pose a much more immediate threat to pri-
vate corporations and to the public in general than the potential
demise of a local university. The establishment of large corporate
foundations to fund numerous community betterment projects is in-
dicative of -the growing sense of corporate social responsibility.14
Indeed, the state enabling statutes speak not in terms of traditional
charitable giving alone, but authorize corporate expenditures for
"the public welfare ... or similar purposes"14 which would seem to
include use of corporate funds for any project reasonably calculated
to further the common good. 44  Moreover, since the federal gov-
ernment has actively solicited private corporations to become in-
volved in urban development by offering direct subsidies for job
training and tax inducements for aid to inner city businesses, it is
extremely unlikely that a state court would refuse to find that such
activities fall within the scope of the state statute authorizing pri-
vate corporations to act for the public welfare.
141 Id.
142 For a discussion of the recent activity of the Ford Foundation funding ghetto
businesses and housing projects, see note 79 supra.
143 See note 138 supra.
144 In James McCord Co. v. Citizens' Hotel Co., 287 S.W. 906 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926), a number of local corporations had pooled their funds to construct a hotel for
the betterment of the dty. When sued for their subscriptions, the corporations defended
on the grounds that operation of a hotel was ultra vires for them since they were not
authorized by their respective charters to engage in the hotel business. The court de-
nied the defense and held that the hotel was a civic enterprise within the statute author-
izing such endeavors by private corporations. The subscriptions were not considered
as being for the purpose of engaging in the hotel business, but were merely seen as a ve-
hicle for a joint effort to construct a hotel as a community enterprise for the welfare of
the dty. See also A. J. Anderson Co. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 8 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928).
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Once a ghetto project is rendered intra vires by virtue of powers
implied in the corporate charter or by the express authority derived
from the enabling statute, the directors must exercise due care and
prudence with respect to 'the ghetto project. If the directors come
to the independent conclusion that involvement in urban develop-
ment is in the best interest of the corporation and are not motivated
by personal gain, the corporate activity will come within the pro-
tection of the "business judgment" rule which will effectively insu-
late the directors from liability to the corporation or its sharehold-
ers for misuse of corporate funds.145  Since many established corpo-
rations have already undertaken substantial programs to develop the
inner city economy by assisting ghetto businesses, 46 there will be
considerable precedent for any given project, thereby providing a
standard upon which to judge the reasonableness of the amounts
expended.
In view of the expanding sense of corporate social responsibility,
the real question may no longer be whether shareholders can re-
strain corporate social activity, but rather whether a group of con-
cerned shareholders can induce a lethargic management to act. As
previously noted,'147 corporate profitability is a partial function of
the general economic prosperity of the local community. The exist-
ence of a large mass of economically deprived people inhibits the
growth of the local economy and thereby retards corporate growth.
Where a corporation is situated close to a ghetto area such that the
possibility of civil disorder poses a direct threat to efficient business
operations, expenditures to eliminate the fundamental causes of ri-
ots may be necessary to protect the business . 48  To the extent that
145 Professor Henn gives the following functional definition of the business judg-
ment rule:
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the cor-
poration's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there is a rea-
sonable basis, and they act in good faith, as a result of their independent dis-
cretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any considerations other than
what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court
will not interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for
that of the directors .... H. HENN, supra note 131 at 365.
14 6 See notes 9, 75, 81, 85-88 supra & accompanying text.
147 See note 69 supra.
148 An inner city plant located near a ghetto area is exposed to the danger that its
property may be burned and looted, causing a sharp rise in insurance rates. The poten-
tial for civil disorder may expose employees to the threat of physical harm, and an ac-
tual riot may necessitate a suspension of operations with a resultant loss of business rev-
enues. Thus, many urban businesses may be faced with the alternative of either moving
their operation away from the danger or taking meaningful steps to eliminate its source.
Cf. Jefferson Mills, Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1965), affd per
curiam, 367 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1966).
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festering slum conditions cause existing businesses to relocate else-
where and discourage the location of new businesses in the area,
corporations situated on or near the -fringes of the core area lose -the
advantages of external economies normally associated with the
concentration of many businesses in one geographic area. Also,
when a corporation physically removed from the imminent threat of
violence fails to participate in efforts initiated by inner city corpora-
tions designed to eradicate slum conditions, the non-participant
company may be regarded as uninterested in the city's welfare
producing a detrimental effect on its public image. By the same to-
ken, active participation in programs to enhance the well-being of
the urban community can be of considerable public relations
value. 14 9
Given the threat of physical harm to business operations, the
ghetto's economic drain on the vitality of the business climate, and
the exhortations for action from the government and the general
public, it may very well be that the failure of the Board of Directors
to institute or participate in an urban development program would
constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty of due care which the di-
rectors owe to the corporation. 50 Since in this context the failure
of the directors to act would constitute negligence to the corpora-
tion, the directors could not invoke the business judgment rule to
absolve themselves from liability.1" ' True, difficulties of measur-
ing damages and establishing causation might very well preclude a
shareholder derivative action seeking to hold the directors person-
ally liable for their failure to protect the corporation from physical
harm and loss of the company's public image stemming from its
failure to join other companies in an urban improvement program.
At the very least, however, the question of the corporation's role in
community development would seem a proper subject for a share-
holder resolution proposing an amendment to the by-laws or the
corporate charter -to the effect -that the company is cognizant of de-
teriorating social and economic conditions in the community and the
concomitant threat to the company's prosperity, and that the di-
rectors should investigate various ways in which company assets and
149 The development efforts initiated by major corporations have received exten-
sive and repeated coverage in national news media. See note 9 supra.
150 Although the guidelines vary slightly among the states, the standard of prudence
and due care owed the corporation by the directors is "that diligence, care and skill which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in their personal
business affairs." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1967).
151 By definition, the business judgment rule presupposes the exercise of due care.
See note 145 supra.
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personnel might be employed to alleviate the danger to the corpo-
ration.'52 The amendment could also state that after thorough in-
vestigation of alternative measures, the directors should implement
a comprehensive program directed toward eliminating the funda-
mental causes of community poverty and discontent. Although de-
lineating a specific program is probably beyond the scope of legiti-
mate shareholder control over management, bringing the basic pol-
icy decision before the shareholders at the annual meeting would
be within the ambit of proper shareholder concerns. 15 In this re-
spect it should be noted that if the corporation is registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 the shareholders might also be
entitled to inclusion of a 100-word statement concerning the pro-
posed resolution in management's proxy solicitation materials.'55
1 52 See Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1955), holding that even
though the shareholders of a corporation lack the authority to designate corporate offi-
cers, they may properly suggest to the directors their collective preference as to which
men should be chosen. Thus, where shareholders lack the power to compel the direc-
tors to involve the corporation in urban development, they may still express their view
on the matter in a shareholder resolution at the annual meeting.
153 See generally Proper Subject: A Symposium, 34 U. DET. L.J. 520 (1957). See
also note 152 supra.
154 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
155 Under Commission Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.14 a-8 (1969), any security
holder entitled to vote may submit a proposal for inclusion on management's proxy so-
licitation statement. If management opposes the proposal, the shareholder is entitled to
inclusion of his name and address and a 100-word statement in support of the proposal.
However, management is not required to print the 100-word statement if the proposal is
"primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, so-
cial or similar causes," Rule 14a-8(c) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.142-8(c) (2) (1969) (em-
phasis added), or relates to "the ordinary business operations of the issuer." Id. Rule
14a-8(c)(5).
In 1951 the S.E.C. rejected a shareholder request under Rule 14a-8(a) for inclusion
of a 100-word statement concerning a shareholder proposal for abolition of segregated
seating on Greyhound buses operating in the South. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). However, it does not appear that the shareholder alleged
that segregated seating constituted an imminent threat to Greyhound's business. Al-
though a shareholder proposal concerning the corporation's involvement in urban de-
velopment would involve promotion of a "general economic cause," it would appear that
in view of the imminent threat to the corporation's business posed by a volatile environ-
ment, such a proposal would not be "primarily" for general economic considerations,
and thus would not be within management's exemption from the 100-word requirement.
Also since the company has not regularly given aid to ghetto business or undertaken
other worthwhile development projects, it cannot be said that a shareholder proposal con-
cerning such activities would relate to the "ordinary business operations" of the company.
Recently, shareholders of Dow Chemical Company attempted to get a proposal on
management's proxy statement to amend the corporation's charter to preclude the com-
pany from selling napalm "to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance
that the substance will not be used on or against human beings." Health Rights News,
May 1968, at 3, col. 3. Management opposed the proposal, and was not required to in-
clude it in its proxy statement because the Dow shareholders had not submitted the pro-
posal within time to allow its inclusion as required by Rule 14a-8(a). Id. In its letter
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is becoming increasingly evident that conventional govern-
ment programs of the welfare type have been unable to solve the
economic and social problems which have precipitated today's urban
crisis. Although certainly not a panacea for these ills, the concen-
tration of private industry in large cities constitutes a vast and
largely untapped resource of capital and problem-solving expertise
which, through imaginative programs, can be effectively utilized to
reduce unemployment and lay the groundwork for the assimilation
of disadvantaged minorities into the mainstream of American
prosperity. Given the inducements provided ,by the tax law and the
absence of any significant legal constraints on the scope of corpo-
rate activity, private industry is limited only by the extent of its ded-
ication and the resourcefulness of its imagination.
WILLIAM S. PADDOCK
to Dow management, the shareholder group listed among their reasons for the proposal
the fact that Dow had been unable to recruit well-qualified college graduates as a result
of bad publicity concerning the sale of napalm, and that Dow had also lost foreign cus-
tomers for the same reason. It remains to be seen whether these or similar economic con-
siderations relating to the prosperity of the corporation will be sufficiently specific to al-
low mandatory inclusion of the 100-word statement on managements proxy solicitation.
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